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Abstract
A Statistical View of Architecture Design
by
Zhaoxia Deng
Computer architectures are becoming more and more complicated to meet the continuously
increasing demand on performance, security and sustainability from applications. Many factors
exist in the design and engineering space of various components and policies in the architec-
tures, and it is not intuitive how these factors interact with each other and how they make im-
pacts on the architecture behaviors. Seeking for the best architectures for specific applications
and requirements automatically is even more challenging. Meanwhile, the architecture design
need to deal with more and more non-determinism from lower level technologies. Emerg-
ing technologies exhibit statistical properties inherently, such as the wearout phenomenon in
NEMs, PCM, ReRAM, etc. Due to the manufacturing and processing variations, there also
exists variability among different devices or within the same device (e.g. different cells on
the same memory chip). Hence, to better understand and control the architecture behaviors,
we introduce the statistical perspective of architecture design: by specifying the architectural
design goals and the desired statistical properties, we guide the architecture design with these
statistical properties and exploit a series of techniques to achieve these properties.
In the first part of the thesis, we introduce Herniated Hash Tables. Our architectural design
goal is that the hash table implementation is highly scalable in both storage efficiency and
performance, while the desired statistical property is to achieve as good storage efficiency
and performance as with uniform distributions given non-uniform distributions across hash
buckets. Herniated Hash Tables exploit multi-level phase change memory (PCM) to in-place
expand storage for each hash bucket to accommodate asymmetrically chained entries. The
vii
organization, coupled with an addressing and prefetching scheme, also improves performance
significantly by creating more memory parallelism.
In the second part of the thesis, we introduce Lemonade from Lemons, harnessing de-
vice wearout to create limited-use security architectures. The architectural design goal is to
create hardware security architectures that resist attacks by statistically enforcing an upper
bound on hardware uses, and consequently attacks. The desired statistical property is that the
system-level minimum and maximum uses can be guaranteed with high probabilities despite of
device-level variability. We introduce techniques for architecturally controlling these bounds
and explore the cost in area, energy and latency of using these techniques to achieve system-
level usage targets given device-level wearout distributions.
In the third part of the thesis, we demonstrate Memory Cocktail Therapy: A General,
Learning-Based Framework to Optimize Dynamic Tradeoffs in NVMs. Limited write endurance
and long latencies remain the primary challenges of building practical memory systems from
NVMs. Researchers have proposed a variety of architectural techniques to achieve different
tradeoffs between lifetime, performance and energy efficiency; however, no individual tech-
nique can satisfy requirements for all applications and different objectives. Our architectural
design goal is that NVM systems can achieve optimal tradeoffs for specific applications and
objectives, and the statistical goal is that the selected NVM configuration is nearly optimal.
Memory Cocktail Therapy uses machine learning techniques to model the architecture behav-
iors in terms of all the configurable parameters based on a small number of sample configu-
rations. Then, it selects the optimal configuration according to user-defined objectives which
leads to the desired tradeoff between performance, lifetime and energy efficiency.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Today’s computing systems are becoming tremendously complex to meet various kinds of de-
mands from applications. In the big data era, applications generate massive data at a speed
of TB per second. The large-scale data continuously demands for faster processing capability,
larger memory capacity and higher throughput, etc. Furthermore, many new types of applica-
tions emerge, such as IoT devices, self-driving vehicles, security systems, automated targeting
systems, etc. Each system seeks for its specific sweet-spot between performance, energy effi-
ciency, accuracy, security, reliability, etc.
To meet all these changing demands from applications, the computing systems have also
evolved from generation to generation. On the one hand, architects strive to scale up the system
performance by intellectually organizing various components and carefully engineering each
component and policy, despite of the diminishing impact of Moore’s Law and many challenges
in the scaling of traditional DRAM systems. However, the increasing complexity made it
extremely difficult to reason about and design these architectures. On the other hand, more and
more complexity has been pushed to the software stack, which drives the birth of many kinds
of cluster computing frameworks, including those tailored for large scale machine learning
problems. To bring the simplicity back to upper-level software systems, architects have never
1
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stopped exploring the emerging hardware technologies to either solve problems in traditional
architectures or reduce their inherent complexity .
Many emerging technologies have shown promising characteristics to architect future com-
puting systems. Non-volatile memories (NVMs) exhibit high density, low static power, and
persistence, which are promising to solve the DRAM scaling issues in traditional architec-
tures. For example, phase change memory (PCM) has been shown possible to work as a
scalable alternative of the traditional DRAM system. Memristors have also been used to ar-
chitect components such as branch predictors and cache directories. In addition to NVMs,
nano-electromechanical devices (NEMs) and molecular devices have smaller scales of physi-
cal dimensions and high tolerance to different temperatures, radiation conditions and electric
fields so that they could be deployed in harsh environments.
This thesis aims to explore new architectures with these emerging technologies, from a
statistical perspective. In the following sections, we first discuss the new challenges in the ar-
chitecture design with emerging technologies. Also, we rethink the architecture design method-
ology and exploit statistical techniques to handle these challenges.
1.1 Motivation
1.1.1 New challenges in architecture design with emerging technologies
There are many challenges associated with building practical systems from emerging tech-
nologies. This thesis focuses on exploring the potential of phase change memory (PCM) and
NEMs switches. We discuss three of the most common challenges in the following sections.
2
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Longer read and write latency in PCM
In multi-level PCM, a single PCM cell can be used to store multiple bits in an asymmetric
manner. The deeper bits (less-significant bits) need more time to be read out and much more
time to be updated than shallower bits (more-significant bits). For read operations, the rela-
tionship between the performance penalty and the number of bits read out is about exponential.
However, it is even worse for write operations. Qureshi et al. proposed schemes such as write
cancellation and write pausing to avoid the delay of response to the following read requests.
Nevertheless, frequent write cancellation operations may hurt the performance and lifetime of
NVM systems.
Limited write endurance
It is common that emerging NVM technologies usually have limited write endurance. For
example, the typical write endurance of PCM cells is about 108. If without special treatment,
the future memory systems from emerging technologies will have short lifetime as (some of)
the memory cells will be worn out soon. As a result, special mechanisms (eg., wear leveling
and/or wear limiting) must be used to guarantee the lifetime of NVM memories.
Device failures of NEMs switches
Even worse than the limited write endurance of PCM cells, NEMs switches suffer from
device failures after tens or hundreds of cycles. Representative NEMS contact switches are
composed of a movable active element and an opposing electrode which interact by both elec-
trical and mechanical forces to open and close the switch. Generally speaking, any kind of
electrical and mechanical aging, adhesion, fracture or burnout in the active element or elec-
trode are potentially responsible for the failures of NEMS switches.
3
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1.1.2 Why is the statistical perspective helpful?
The quantitative approach has been the classical methodology of architecture design. How-
ever, simply relying on quantitative measurements seem insufficient to handle the tremendous
complexity of recent architectures and the new challenges exposed from emerging technolo-
gies. In this thesis, we propose to specify statistical properties at the interfaces between applica-
tions, architectures and devices. The statistical interface will be necessary for two reasons: one
arises from the large-scale, fine-grained configuration space; another from the non-determinism
of device level technologies.
Large-scale, fine-grained configuration space
Due to various types of applications and computing environments, each system needs to
satisfy specific QoS requirements while seeking for its sweet-spot among performance, energy
efficiency, accuracy, manufacturing cost, etc. Meanwhile, recent architectures usually consist
of many components and complicated policies to coordinate these components. It is not intu-
itive how to determine the best configuration for each specific application and objective from
the large-scale, fine-grained configuration space. An expressive abstract between the hardware
and applications is demanded so that the capacity of hardware can be utilized maximally and
the optimization of configurations can be done adaptively.
Non-determinism of device level technologies
The wearout phenomenon is commonly seen in emerging technologies such as NEMs,
PCM, ReRAM, etc, which means that the device can only work for a limited number of times.
As most researchers try to mitigate the wearout problem, we take a contrarian view and ex-
ploit the wearout to create physically-enforced security architectures. The challenging issue,
however, is that it is usually not deterministic when the device will stop functioning. Fur-
4
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thermore, manufacturing and processing variations can result in significant variations among
devices or cells on the same device. Therefore, to treat the non-determinism of device varia-
tions, we exploit probabilistic modeling of the underlying device behaviors and exploit a series
of techniques to provide statistical guarantees on the architectural behaviors.
1.2 Thesis statement
In this thesis, we propose the statistical architecture design methodology, to treat the above
challenges in emerging technologies.
By specifying the architectural design goals and the desired statistical properties, we guide
the architecture design with these statistical properties and exploit a series of techniques to
achieve these properties.
In general, we first formalize the statistical interface between applications, architectures
and devices. Then, the probabilistic modeling of the underlying devices is used to handle the
device variability. Also, machine learning techniques are helpful to dynamically select the
optimal configuration for specific applications and targets.
1.3 Thesis contribution
In this thesis, we first explore the novel architecture design with emerging technologies with
the following three cases. Each of the three architectures resolve some of these challenges in
building new systems from emerging technologies. Furthermore, we investigate the statistical
architecture design methodology with these cases. The contributions of each architecture are
listed in the following sections.
5
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1.3.1 Herniated Hash Tables: Exploiting Multi-Level Phase Change Mem-
ory for In-Place Data Expansion
Hash tables are a commonly used data structure used in many algorithms and applica-
tions. As applications and data scale, the efficient implementation of hash tables becomes
increasingly important and challenging. In particular, memory capacity becomes increasingly
important and entries can become asymmetrically chained across hash buckets. This chain-
ing prevents two forms of parallelism: memory-level parallelism (allowing multiple prefetch
requests to overlap) and memory-computation parallelism (allowing computation to overlap
memory operations). We propose, herniated hash tables, a technique that exploits multi-level
phase change memory (PCM) storage to expand storage at each hash bucket and increase par-
allelism without increasing physical space. The technique works by increasing the number of
bits stored within the same resistance range of an individual PCM cell. We pack more data
into the same bit by decreasing noise margins, and we pay for this higher density with higher
latency reads and writes that resolve the more accurate resistance values. Furthermore, our or-
ganization, coupled with an addressing and prefetching scheme, increases memory parallelism
of the herniated datastructure. We simulate our system with a variety of hash table applications
and evaluate the density and performance benefits in comparison to a number of baseline sys-
tems. Compared with conventional chained hash tables on single-level PCM, herniated hash
tables can achieve 4.8x density on a 4-level PCM while achieving up to 67% performance
improvement.
1.3.2 Lemonade from Lemons: Harnessing Device Wearout to Create
Limited-Use Security Architectures
Most architectures are designed to mitigate the usually undesirable phenomenon of device
wearout. We take a contrarian view and harness this phenomenon to create hardware secu-
6
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rity mechanisms that resist attacks by statistically enforcing an upper bound on hardware uses,
and consequently attacks. For example, let us assume that a user may log into a smartphone
a maximum of 50 times a day for 5 years, resulting in approximately 91,250 legitimate uses.
If we assume at least 8-character passwords and we require login (and retrieval of the storage
decryption key) to traverse hardware that wears out in 91,250 uses, then an adversary has a
negligible chance of successful brute-force attack before the hardware wears out, even assum-
ing real-world password cracking by professionals. M-way replication of our hardware and
periodic re-encryption of storage can increase the daily usage bound by a factor of M. The key
challenge is to achieve practical statistical bounds on both minimum and maximum uses for
an architecture, given that individual devices can vary widely in wearout characteristics. We
introduce techniques for architecturally controlling these bounds and perform a design space
exploration for three use cases: a limiteduse connection, a limited-use targeting system and
one-time pads. These techniques include decision trees, parallel structures, Shamirs secret-
sharing mechanism, Reed-Solomon codes, and module replication. We explore the cost in
area, energy and latency of using these techniques to achieve system-level usage targets given
device-level wearout distributions. With redundant encoding, for example, we can improve ex-
ponential sensitivity to device lifetime variation to linear sensitivity, reducing the total number
of NEMS devices by 4 orders of magnitude to about 0.8 million for limited-use connections
(compared with 4 billion if without redundant encoding).
1.3.3 Memory Cocktail Therapy: A General Learning-Based Framework
to Optimize Dynamic Tradeoffs in NVMs
Non-volatile memories (NVMs) have attracted significant interest recently due to their
high-density, low static power, and persistence. There are, however, several challenges associ-
ated with building practical systems from NVMs, including limited write endurance and long
7
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latencies. Researchers have proposed a variety of architectural techniques which can achieve
different tradeoffs between lifetime, performance and energy efficiency; however, no individ-
ual technique can satisfy requirements for all applications and different objectives. Hence,
we propose Memory Cocktail Therapy (MCT), a general, learning-based framework that adap-
tively chooses the best techniques for the current application and objectives. Specifically, MCT
performs four procedures to adapt the techniques to various scenarios. First,MCTformulates a
high-dimensional configuration space from all different combinations of techniques. Second,
MCT selects primary features from the configuration space with lasso regularization. Third,
MCT estimates lifetime, performance and energy consumption using lightweight online pre-
dictors (eg. quadratic regression and gradient boosting) and a small set of configurations guided
by the selected features. Finally, given the estimation of all configurations, MCT selects the op-
timal configuration based on the user-defined objectives. As a proof of concept, we test MCTs
ability to guarantee different lifetime targets and achieve 95% of maximum performance, while
minimizing energy consumption. We find that MCT improves performance by 9.24% and re-
duces energy by 7.95% compared to the best static configuration. Moreover, the performance
of MCT is 94.49% of the ideal configuration with only 5.3% more energy consumption.
1.4 The outline of the thesis
The rest of the thesis will present three architectures with more details, in Chapter 2, 3,
4, respectively. Then we will discuss the future work that follows the three architectures in
Chapter 5. In the end, we conclude the thesis in Chapter 6.
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Herniated Hash Tables: Exploiting
Multi-Level Phase Change Memory for
In-Place Data Expansion
2.1 Introduction
Compared with DRAM, phase-change memory (PCM) shows a number of promising at-
tributes, including higher density, non-volatility and low static power consumption. Therefore,
it is considered a possible substitute for the DRAM technique. Another interesting attribute
of PCM is that a single PCM cell can be used to store multiple bits in an asymmetric manner.
The deeper bits (less-significant bits) need more time to be read out and much more time to
be updated than shallower bits (more-significant bits). However, for the long read latency, it is
possible to develop a prefetching mechanism that manages to prefetch out the deep-level data
from PCM before their usage with a step-wise multi-level read operation. For the long write
latency, Qureshi et al. [1] have proposed schemes such as write cancellation and write pausing
to avoid the delay of response to the following read requests. Therefore, the overall system
9
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needs not to suffer from the long access latency of deep-level data.
Conventional hash tables usually use chained structures to save memory space. The ad-
dresses of entries are allocated dynamically and distributed randomly in memory, which pre-
vents prefetching and instruction-level parallelism. Moreover, with multi-level PCM, the per-
formance of conventional hash tables will decrease dramatically because of the high read and
write latency. In this chapter, we introduce the herniated hash table, which exploits multi-level
PCM and provides dense and efficient storage with support of dynamic in-place expansion and
non-uniform growth of the hash tables. By designing an addressing scheme for the multi-level
PCM and using multi-level PCM aware hash table structures and prefetching schemes, the her-
niated hash table performs better than the conventional hash table design from the following
two perspectives: On one hand, the herniated hash table yields similar performance with less
storage compared with the conventional hash table on single-level PCM; On the other hand, the
herniated hash table achieves much better performance with similar storage overhead compared
with the conventional hash table on multi-level PCM.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We first provide background information
on multi-level PCM and its operations in Section 2.2. Then, Section 2.3 presents our herni-
ated hash table design. Section 2.4 describes our experimental methodology, and Section 2.5
presents our results. Finally, Section 2.6 discusses related work, and Section 2.7 draws our
conclusions.
2.2 Background of Multi-Level PCM
Phase-change memory (PCM) is one type of resistive memory, the resistance of whose
cells can be changed in a wide range. An analog-to-digital circuit (ADC) reads the resistance
as a digital value. Depending on the ADC setting, the same resistance of a PCM cell could
be interpreted as a different number of bits. Alibart et al. [2] showed that a single resistive
10
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Figure 2.2: Latency to access different PCM levels.
memory cell can be used to store up to seven bits of data. Figure 2.1 shows an example of
a multi-level PCM cell: the same resistance of the cell can be interpreted as b0 when the
ADC is using one-level accuracy and as b00 and b001, respectively, when the ADC is using
two-level and three-level accuracy. This precision comes with a cost. Read latency increases
exponentially with the number of bits stored in the PCM cell and write latency is even higher
than that. However, as shown in Figure 2.1, multi-level PCM read can be operated in a step-
11
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wise approximate manner: that is, after reading a shallow bit of a PCM cell, the read operation
can be continued to further read out its deeper level bits. Therefore, if the data are carefully
organized in multi-level PCM, we can use this step-wise read attribute to develop an efficient
prefetching mechanism.
Although write latency of deep-level PCM accesses is also very high, we assume that our
target applications have much more read accesses than write accesses to the hash tables. More-
over, as our scheme enables both instruction-level parallelism and memory-computation par-
allelism, the write latency (which is usually caused by the write back requests from the last
level cache) doesn’t have significant effects on the critical path of the processor’s pipeline.
If the write latency is too long that the following read requests are affected, write cancella-
tion and write pausing techniques [1] will help by prioritizing the following read requests to
remove potential pipeline stalls. We use the conservative configuration with the write cancel-
lation technique in all of our systems that run on the multi-level PCM. Better combinations of
write cancellation and write pausing are possible according to [1]. We’ll also discuss the case
without write cancellation in Section 2.5.
In this work, similar to previous work [3], we have an exponential latency model for multi-
level PCM read accesses (the exponential base is 2.0) and a higher latency model for multi-level
PCM write accesses: as shown in Figure 2.2, a PCM read takes 120 ns, 240 ns, 480 ns, and
960 ns respectively, and a PCM write takes 150 ns, 600 ns, 1800 ns, 4800 ns respectively for
one, two, three, and four levels.
2.3 Herniated Hash Tables
In this section, we firstly explain the inefficiency of the conventional hash table design on
multi-level PCM and present the design of the herniated hash table (HHT), with emphasis on
the HHT’s differences from a conventional hash table on the same PCM system. Then we
12
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ventional linked list-based hash table and the herniated hash table.
introduce a new addressing scheme for the multi-level PCM system since traditional virtual
to physical address mapping schemes are not efficient in multi-level PCM. Based on that, we
design multiple prefetching schemes to improve the performance of memory accesses.
The conventional hash table is implemented with an array of linked lists. The length of
the array is the number of buckets. Each array entry is an address that points to the linked list
of hash entries that fall into the same bucket. The single-level PCM system behaves similarly
as traditional DRAM. Without loss of generality, we assume the single-level PCM capacity
is 1 GB. The multi-level PCM system is assumed to be four levels, with 0–1 GB on the first
level, 1–2 GB on the second level, 2–3 GB on the third level, and 3–4 GB on the fourth level.
Multi-level PCM systems with more levels will also be analyzed in the sensitivity studies.
2.3.1 The Basic Herniated Hash Table Design
Figure 2.3 shows a snapshot of the organizations of both the conventional hash table and
the HHT. Both of them contain N buckets.
The conventional hash table, as shown in Figure 2.3(a), starts with an array of N pointers
(i.e., head pointers), and each head pointer points to the first valid entry of the corresponding
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Figure 2.4: The timing of accessing different hash entries in Figure 2.3.
hash bucket. Each conventional hash table entry contains three fields: key, which identifies the
entry; value, which contains the information for the entry; and next entry ptr, which points to
the next entry in the same bucket. This conventional implementation is not very efficient on
a multi-level PCM. The main problem is that, since it is not multi-level PCM-aware, both the
head pointers and entries can be placed randomly at any level in PCM, and therefore may need
a long latency to access if they happen to be in deep levels. Another intrinsic problem of the
conventional hash table is that it uses pointers to link the entries and the addresses of entries
are dynamically allocated and randomly distributed in the physical memory address space. It
is hard to either parallelize the computation and data retrieving because we don’t know the
address of the next entry beforehand, or use a prefetching mechanism to retrieve the entries
faster due to the lack of spacial locality in memory.
In Figure 2.3(b), we show the organization of the HHT. At first, the HHT only uses the first
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level of the PCM, and it initially contains an array of N hash entries (i.e., the first hash entry
of each bucket). Whenever possible, the HHT always puts the entries from the same bucket in
the same PCM cells but in different levels (e.g., entries A 1 to A 3). If the current cells have
already reached their level limit (in our case, four levels), new PCM cells will be allocated to
store extra hash entries. The deepest level of the previous PCM cells will be transferred to a
redirect pointer, which points to the newly allocated space at the first PCM level (e.g., entry Q 4
in the figure). This data organization creates spacial locality in memory and removes most of
the links that blocks instruction-level parallelism. In general, compared with the conventional
design, the benefits of the HHT are three-fold:
• More Compact Hash Table Structure. As shown in Figure 2.3, each entry in the HHT
has only two fields, key and value, and it does not need a pointer field (like next entry ptr
in a conventional hash entry). Moreover, the HHT does not need a separate array of head
pointers, which is also needed in the conventional hash table. The HHT, however, has
two storage drawbacks. First, it has to pre-allocate a hash entry for every bucket (even if
a bucket is never used at all). Second, if there are too many entries in one bucket, then
additional storage is needed for redirect pointers. However, we shall see in Section 2.5
that the storage merits of HHTs usually outweigh their drawbacks.
• Shorter Latency to Access Buckets with Few Entries. HHTs always insert a new hash
table entry into the shallowest unused level. Therefore, for a hash bucket with few entries
(i.e., 1-2 entries), only the shallow PCM levels are used. As a result, accessing these
entries in these buckets will have a relatively short latency. Figure 2.4(a) shows such a
situation: in the conventional hash table, entries A 1 and A 2 are buried in deeper levels
(levels 4 and 3, respectively), whereas, in the HHT, these two entries are deliberately
placed in the shallowest levels (levels 1 and 2, respectively). As a result, it takes less
time to access entry A 2 in the HHT.
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Note that, when accessing an entry in a bucket with many entries, the HHT without
prefetching may take a longer time than the conventional hash table, as shown in Figure
2.4(b). In this case the HHT also needs to use deeper PCM levels, and it takes a long
time to access the entries. Additionally, the HHT needs extra time to access redirect
pointers. We improve the system performance in this situation with prefetching, which
will be explained later.
• Ability to Prefetch Entries. In a hash table lookup function, to find the matched entry,
the function needs to traverse through the hash entries of the corresponding bucket. In
a conventional hash table, since there is no special relationship among the addresses of
successive entries (because they are linked by pointers), prefetching can not be accom-
plished without complex pointer-tracing hardware. The HHT, however, stores several
entries contiguously for each bucket, which enables prefetching. With step-wise read-
ing, we can get multiple entries ready with exponential latency. The prefetching is very
effective for hash tables because the access pattern tends to be traversing all the entries
in the same bucket. We will discuss the prefetching schemes for the HHT in detail in
Section 2.3.3.
2.3.2 Addressing HHTs
A critical challenge in exploiting multi-level PCM lies in how the data will be addressed and
stored in the cache hierarchy. To access data at different levels in the same PCM cells, each
level is potentially to be addressed as a separate physical page for a given page of physical
PCM cells. Correspondingly, four-times (for four-level PCM) of the virtual address space will
be utilized to represent all entries. Traditional virtual to physical address translation schemes
[4][5][6][7] include multi-level forward page tables [8][9], inverted page tables [10] or hashed
page tables [11] for memory efficient mapping between virtual addresses and physical ad-
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dresses. However, when both the utilized physical and virtual address space are scaled, the
existing schemes will all suffer from proportional increase in storage for the page tables.
HHTs exploit a multi-level PCM aware addressing scheme. The HHT tries to store the hash
entries belonging to the same bucket in different levels of the same PCM cells. In addressing,
this corresponds to different virtual pages with the same offset. Only the most significant
address bits differ in addresses for different virtual pages. In this manner, successive HHT
entries in the same bucket can be directly addressed by software by using the corresponding
addresses in a sequence of physical pages. We don’t need to increase storage for the page table
since the addressing of different virtual pages for the same hash bucket follows a sequential
pattern.
This scheme requires us to pay for potential hash table growth in terms of physical address,
but allows us to defer allocating physical space in the HHT as needed for each hash table
entry. For example, an HHT based upon four-level PCM would be addressed by four-times
the physical addresses, but it would begin with only one-time the actual storage and grow as
needed as the number of hash entries increases in one bucket.
An important advantage of this physical addressing scheme is that it allows multi-level
PCM to be seamlessly integrated into the hash hierarchy. Data at multiple levels can be easily
fetched (and prefetched) into caches. To avoid cache conflicts, we sequentially add a shift: the
cache block size to the addresses of different virtual pages for the same hash bucket so that
entries in this bucket will fall into different cache sets.
2.3.3 Prefetching Schemes for Herniated Hash Tables
The prefetching schemes for the HHT are based on two observations. First, the hash entries
in the same bucket tend to be placed in the same PCM cells. Second, to read out a deep entry,
the shallower entries in the same PCM cells (e.g., entries A 1 and A 2) need to be read out first.
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Figure 2.5: Different prefetching schemes for the herniated hash table
18
Herniated Hash Tables Chapter 2
Therefore, the basic idea of prefetching schemes in the HHT is that, when accessing a shallow-
level entry, we perform a deep-level read that reads out all the entries on the corresponding
memory cells and buffers them for future use. Figure 2.4 illustrates the timing diagrams for
such a case: when the program accesses entry A 1 (which is on the first level), instead of
operating a single-level PCM read, the memory controller issues a three-level PCM read to
read out all the successive used entries on the same memory cells (entries A 1, A 2, and A 3).
Therefore, when the program accesses entry A 2 later, there is no longer a need to operate
a PCM read. Note that, since the data in the multi-level PCM are read out in a step-wise
manner, entry A 1 is read out with the same latency (level one read latency) irrespective of
the total number of bits stored in the same cells. That is, when using prefetching, there is no
performance penalty to read out shallow-level entries.
There are multiple trade-offs in implementing a practical prefetching mechanism for the
HHT (named as herniated prefetcher). Here we present the two most important ones:
• On-Chip vs. Off-Chip. In a modern processor, the memory controllers are usually
implemented on-chip and the main memory (PCM in our case) is placed off-chip. The
interface between these two components involves long latency and limited bandwidth. If
the herniated prefetcher is implemented on-chip, as shown in Figures 2.5(b) and 2.5(c),
the processor can get the prefetched data from the HHT with relatively low latency, but
this will require higher memory bandwidth to transfer all the prefetched data from off-
chip memory. If the prefetcher is implemented off-chip, as shown in Figures 2.5(a), the
situation is just the opposite—there is no need for additional memory bandwidth, but the
processor may suffer longer latency to access the prefetched data.
• Buffering vs. Bufferless. A prefetcher often comes with an additional buffer to store
the prefetched data, as shown in Figures 2.5(a) and 2.5(b). Some recent commercial pro-
cessors, however, use bufferless prefetchers, which directly prefetch the data into the last
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level cache (LLC). Compared with buffering, the bufferless prefetcher reduces on-chip
storage cost. Bufferless options, however, may cause cache pollution when prefetching
the wrong data or the right data at the wrong time.
Figure 2.5 shows three possible prefetching schemes for the HHT, namely (a) an off-chip
prefetcher that prefetches data to an off-chip buffer; (b) an on-chip prefetcher that prefetches
data to an on-chip buffer, and (c) a LLC prefetcher that prefetches data to LLC. In Section 2.5,
we will quantitatively compare these prefetching schemes.
2.4 Methodology
We simulate our HHT systems on gem5 [12], a detailed, event-driven system simulator. We
used the system emulation (SE) mode, as it is more efficient and it also supports simple address
translation in the TLB, which helps simulate our addressing scheme. Section 2.4.1 explains the
system simulation parameters in detail. Section 2.4.2 describes multiple benchmark kernels to
drive our evaluation. Finally, Section 2.4.3 discusses several baseline systems that will be
compared to our HHT systems.
2.4.1 Simulation Configuration
The parameters of the processor and memory system used in our experiments are listed
in Table 1. The processor configuration is similar to the ARM Cortex A9 single core pro-
cessor [13], which has a superscalar pipeline that forwards eight instructions per cycle to the
decoder. Two levels of caches are used with this processor. As the HHT system uses PCM,
we simulate a multi-level PCM and a single level PCM (for base line systems) on the nvmain
[14] memory simulator, which supports modeling of realistic timing and queuing delay of
multi-level PCM. For single-level PCM accesses, the memory latency includes the memory
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Table 2.1: Simulation parameters, similar to ARM Cortex A9 single-core processor
CPU 2 GHz, single core, out-of-order, alpha ISA, 8-issue
width, 64-byte cacheline size
L1 $ 32 KB I/D-cache, 4-way, 2-cycle latency, 6 MSHR
L2 $ 512 KB, 8-way, 12-cycle latency, 16 MSHR
Memory Controller 10 ns latency
Memory 4 GB; 1 channel, 1 rank and 4 banks;
Row buffer size 1KB
Multi-level PCM latency for level N:
read latency: (120∗2(N−1))ns
write latency: (150∗N ∗2(N−1))ns
controller latency, memory bus transmission latency, and PCM read latency. For the multi-
level PCM, the simulator models exponential read latency as more bits are read out. All data
levels are available after the highest level is read out. For write requests to the multi-level
PCM, the simulator needs to read out all existing bits first, modify the bits to be updated, and
write all the bits back to the PCM cells in the end. Table 2.1 lists the timing configuration in
detail. For most of our experiments, we used four-level PCM for the multi-level PCM, but we
will also discuss using more levels in Section 2.5.4.
2.4.2 Benchmarks
To focus the evaluation on the hash tables’ performance in particular, we take hash table
kernels from three benchmarks: Internet routing, Wordcount, and Dedup. The Internet rout-
ing benchmark takes a real trace of router traffic and builds a hash table for the mapping of
IP addresses and their next hops. Wordcount is a program that counts the frequency of each
unique word in a large text file. Dedup is a data stream compression algorithm from the PAR-
SEC Suite [15]. It exploits a hash table to store and look up data blocks to find compression
opportunities.
Table 2.2 shows the workload characterization of the benchmarks. We use similar scale
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Table 2.2: Hashtable benchmark workload characterization
Benchmarks Number of Hash Entries Number of Lookups Simulated Period (ns)
Internet
Routing
50,000 2,050,000 14.5
Wordcount 44,998 2,000,000 6.7
Dedup 45,941 1,139,905 0.82
workloads for the hash tables in three benchmarks to simplify comparisons: the hash tables
need to store around 45,000 entries in total and respond to around two million lookups (includ-
ing searching and insertion). The simulated period is the longest gem5 simulated seconds for
each benchmark with 1,024 buckets of chained hash tables on the single-level PCM.
We experiment with four hash table configurations: 8,192, 4,096, 2,048, and 1,024 buckets.
Varying the number of buckets helps us characterize hash table behaviors in different situations
and compare the scalability of different hash table systems. Figure 2.6 plots the bucket length
distributions with four hash table configurations for the total workload of the Wordcount bench-
mark. With fewer buckets, the average number of entries in the bucket increases and the bucket
size becomes more nonuniform. In this situation, it is more challenging to efficiently store
the hash table and traverse all entries in each bucket at the same time. Furthermore, we take
snapshots of the hash table bucket length distributions in the middle of each benchmark’s ex-
ecution. Figure 2.7 shows snapshots of the Wordcount benchmark with 1,024 buckets. These
snapshots are taken in the middle of the program execution when 20%, 40%, 60%, and 80%
of the total execution is finished respectively, to give a picture of the intermediate hash table
structure when lookups happen (how many entries to traverse in each bucket). We’ll show that
HHT can get both good storage efficiency and good performance when the bucket length scales
dynamically.
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Figure 2.6: Wordcount using different numbers of buckets
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Figure 2.7: Snapshots of Wordcount with 1,024 buckets
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Table 2.3: Hashtable system configuration
Baseline systems Hash Node Structure Memory Latency
Model
Multi-level
Storage
CHT on Single-level
PCM
key, value, pointer to next single-level No
CHT on Multi-level
PCM
key, value, pointer to next multi-level Yes
HHT without
Prefetching
key, value multi-level Yes
2.4.3 Baseline Systems
We compare our HHT schemes with several baseline systems with different software and
hardware implementations. We list the baseline systems and their difference in software im-
plementation, hardware storage, and latency models in Table 2.3.
For chained hash tables (CHTs), we use a common implementation based on linked lists.
The hash table maintains an array of linked lists, each of which stores hash entries that fall
into the same bucket. Each linked list node contains three elements: the key, the value, and the
pointer to the next entry in the same bucket. Chained hash tables on the single-level PCM is
similar to the traditional hash table implementations on DRAM. The single-level PCM access
latency is the sum of memory control latency, memory bus latency, and memory read latency.
To increase the storage efficiency of hash tables, we implement chained hash tables on the
multi-level PCM as a baseline system in the following way: hash entries are dynamically al-
located and randomly distributed in the multi-level PCM address space. In this system, the
memory latency model follows the exponential read and write timing model as shown in Fig-
ure 2.2.
As discussed in the previous sections, the chained hash tables prevent both memory-level
and instruction memory- level parallelisms. In the herniated hash tables (HHT) implementa-
tion, each entry contains just two elements: the key and the value. We use an array to maintain
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hash entries in the same bucket. There are no links between entries except when the number
of collisions in one bucket exceeds the maximum level of the PCM. Taking an HHT imple-
mentation without prefetching as a baseline, we can see how much overhead is caused by the
exponential latency model of the multi-level PCM and the effectiveness of prefetching schemes
to tolerate this latency.
2.5 Results
In this section, we present evaluation results on HHTs, focusing on several issues.
First, storage efficiency analysis results are explained in Section 2.5.1, comparing HHTs
with CHTs on single-level PCM and multi-level PCM, respectively.
Second, we present the performance analysis of HHTs in all benchmarks in terms of exe-
cution time and IPC (instructions per cycle). We also study the impact of the write cancellation
technique and present the performance results with and without write cancellation.
Third, the impact of different prefetching schemes discussed in earlier sections is analyzed,
in terms of execution time, LLC miss rate, average LLC miss latency and the memory traffic.
Finally, we explore the sensitivity of systems to using different numbers of buckets and
deeper levels of PCM. All of the normalized metrics take HHTs without prefetching as the
baseline.
2.5.1 Storage Efficiency Analysis
We define storage efficiency as the number of used memory cells here. Let N be the number
of buckets in our hash tables and M be the number of unique keys in the workload. A HHT
entry takes 16B and a CHT node takes 24B. HHTs use the space of the array of head entries
plus the space for redirected entries, which equals (N+ redirect pointers)∗16B. CHTs on the
single-level PCM takes the array of head entry pointers plus the actual storage of all entries,
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Figure 2.8: Storage efficiency of HHTs
which is (N ∗8B+M ∗24B). Chained hash tables on the four-levels PCM has four times the
address space of the single-level PCM, so it takes 1/4 of the storage as on the single-level
PCM.
Figure 2.8 shows the normalized storage efficiency results for HHTs and CHTs with 2048
buckets on the single-level PCM and on the multi-level PCM in three benchmarks. The HHTs
get around 4.8x the benefits of the CHTs on the single-level PCM and 1.14x the benefits of
CHTs on the multi-level PCM. When M is much bigger than N, HHTs have significant density
benefits. We will discuss situations when M is close to N in the sensitivity study in Sec-
tion 2.5.3.
2.5.2 Performance Analysis
Instructions per Cycle
For a given processor, the number of instructions per cycle (IPC) reflects the instruction-
level parallelism that different systems can achieve. As discussed in the previous sections,
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herniated hash tables enable both instruction-level parallelism and instruction memory-level
parallelism, so we can see substantial improvements in IPC.
Figure 2.9 plots the normalized IPC of three benchmarks with different hash table systems.
We use 2048 buckets for all hash table systems to simplify the comparison. Performance with
different number of buckets is shown in the sensitivity study in Section 2.5.3. The normalized
IPC results in Figure 2.9 show that HHTs can achieve a 60% improvement over CHTs on the
single-level PCM and about a 4x improvement over the CHTs on the multi-level PCM in terms
of IPC. HHTs with LLC prefetching can achieve up to 1.66x improvement over HHTs without
prefetching.
Execution Time
We also plot the execution time of benchmarks with different hash table systems to conduct
a general performance evaluation. As shown in Figure 2.10, HHTs with LLC prefetching are
up to 1.66x faster than HHTs without prefetching and more than 2.4x faster than the CHTs
on the multi-level PCM. Compared with the CHTs on the single-level PCM, The HHTs with
prefetching are 44% faster while achieving significant density benefits, as indicated in Sec-
tion 2.5.1.
Write cancellation
Write cancellation [1] is an existing work to reduce read latency by canceling the already
scheduled write requests if a read request arrives to the same bank within a period. As the
write latency of multi-level PCM is very high, the write requests could significantly increase
the effective latency of later arriving read requests. In most of our experiments, we use write
cancellation as a built-in technique in multi-level PCM. In this section, we study the perfor-
mance of our hash table systems if using multi-level PCM without write cancellation.
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Figure 2.9: IPC of the benchmarks with different systems
Figure 2.11 and Figure 2.12 show the IPC and execution time results without write cancel-
lation. For the Internet routing and Dedup benchmarks, IPC and execution time have no much
difference using multi-level PCM with or without write cancellation because the read requests
are much more than write requests. However, in the Wordcount benchmark, the number of
write requests is similar to the number of read requests. The long write latency may cause
a decrease in the system performance. From Figure 2.11, HHTs with LLC prefetching still
achieve higher IPC than CHTs on single-level PCM but the improvement decreases from 60%
to 52%. From Figure 2.12, the correspondent speedup of HHTs with LLC prefetching over
CHTs on single-level PCM decreases from 44% to 27% for the Wordcount benchmark.
2.5.3 Sensitivity to Different Hash Table Configurations
Hash table behavior varies considerably when we configure them with different numbers of
buckets, as shown in the workload characterization histograms. When fewer buckets are used,
the number of collisions in each bucket increases. In this part of the experiments, we study the
scalability of hash tables in both storage efficiency and performance in tolerating the increased
number of collisions. We choose one representative benchmark, Wordcount, and study the
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Figure 2.10: Execution time of the benchmarks with different systems
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Figure 2.11: IPC of the benchmarks using multi-level PCM without write cancellation
hash table behavior with different numbers of buckets.
Storage
Varying the number of buckets can have the following effects on the storage. On the one
hand, HHTs need more redirect pointers when fewer buckets are used while CHTs don’t have
this storage overhead. On the other hand, each hash table needs to keep an array of bucket
head entries that is linear with respect to the number of buckets. In CHTs, this array stores just
pointers (eight bytes) to the head entries. In the HHTs, this array stores real keys and values
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Figure 2.12: Execution time of the benchmarks using multi-level PCM without write cancellation
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Figure 2.13: Storage efficiency of Wordcount with different numbers of buckets
(sixteen bytes). When the number of buckets is very large, there are many bucket head entries
to store, even though some of the buckets are empty. HHTs have higher storage overhead
for these head entries than CHTs. However, these two effects are in the opposite directions.
Generally considering them together results in little difference in storage efficiency when the
number of buckets changes, as shown in Figure 2.13. The HHTs are more storage efficient in
all settings compared with CHTs on both the single-level PCM and the multi-level PCM.
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Figure 2.14: Performance of Wordcount with different numbers of buckets
Performance
Figure 2.14 shows the performance in terms of both execution time and IPC of Wordcount
with different hash table systems and different numbers of buckets. For 8192 buckets, the
HHTs with LLC prefetching are 12%, 59.4%, and 5.5x faster than CHTs on the single-level
PCM, HHTs without prefetching, and CHTs on the multi-level PCM respectively. When the
number of buckets decreases, the number of collisions starts to increase. the HHTs can tolerate
more collisions because there are more prefetching opportunities. The CHTs cannot prefetch
because of the dependencies between data accesses in the chained structure, so their perfor-
mance degrades more quickly compared with the HHTs. For 1,024 buckets, HHTs with LLC
prefetching show much better performance compared with CHTs on the single-level PCM by
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Figure 2.15: Sensitivity to PCM levels
achieving 1.87x IPC and 49% speedup in execution time.
2.5.4 Sensitivity to PCM Levels
When the PCM has more levels, herniated hash tables can yield more benefits by deeper
prefetching and more overlap between computation and memory accesses. However, since
latency is exponential with respect to the depth of the level accessed, there is a significant over-
head when the highest level is accessed from PCM. In this section we study the performance
of HHTs when using PCM with more levels.
Figure 2.15 shows the execution time of hash table systems using 4 levels, 5 levels, and 6
levels PCM respectively. Comparing the execution time of HHTs with and without prefetching
with different levels, we can see that the contribution of the prefetching scheme increases
by 12% from 4 levels to 5 levels because of more prefetching opportunities. However, the
prefetching is less effective with 6 levels because the prefetching of one highest level entry
will increase system latency significantly if the prefetched data is not used. In this situation,
CHTs on the single-level PCM can get the best performance, but without density benefit. One
future work is to study how to utilize different amount of levels in PCM dynamically for HHTs
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Figure 2.16: Performance of different prefetching schemes
to yield the best performance for different applications while getting the density benefit as well.
2.5.5 Impact of Different Prefetching Schemes
We discussed three possible prefetching schemes for herniated hash tables: off-chip prefetcher,
on-chip prefetcher, and LLC prefetcher. These three options were motivated by the idea that
we want to prefetch the data close to the processor to maximize the parallelism between in-
structions and memory. The off-chip prefetcher operates alongside the memory row buffer,
which reads out all levels of data iteratively on a low-level access. This prefetcher saves the
memory read latency in the multi-level PCM. The on-chip prefetcher prefetches all levels of
data to an on-chip buffer in the memory controller. It saves the transmission latency on the
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Figure 2.17: LLC Performance with different prefetching schemes
memory bus at the expense of a little more memory traffic. The LLC prefetcher moves the
prefetched data into the last-level cache. It is the closest to the processor but may cause the
cache pollution problem. Figure 2.16 shows the experimental results of the prefetchers, with
2,048-bucket hash tables.
We evaluate three benchmarks with all prefetching schemes. The HHTs without prefetch-
ing are taken as the baseline. From the execution time and IPC results as shown in Figure 2.16,
we can see that the LLC prefetcher exhibits the best performance in general. The main reason
is shown in the LLC miss rate result in Figure 2.17. With the LLC prefetcher, the LLC miss
35
Herniated Hash Tables Chapter 2
rate in the HHTs is reduced by about 6%, while the LLC average miss latency is similar to that
of the other two prefetchers. Both the LLC prefetcher and the on-chip prefetcher need to fetch
data to on chip storage. They achieve a little better performance than the off-chip at the expense
of memory traffic. We quantify the memory traffic overhead of the on-chip prefetching, which
is about 8.9% increase.
2.6 Related Work
2.6.1 Multi-level Phase Change Memories
Recently, a number of studies have discussed how to support multi-level PCM (and other
multi-level non-volatile memory) on both hardware and software sides. Qureshi et al. [16]
used a hardware-software hybrid scheme to improve the performance of multi-level PCM by
converting the most often used multi-level pages into single-level PCM pages. Zhou et al.
[17] extended this to a scheme for the virtual machine environment. Jiang et al. [18] focused
on improving the performance of multi-level PCM writes with the assistance of ECC bits in
memory. Joshi et al. [19] proposed controlling the write pulses of multi-level PCM, thereby
improving its performance as well as reducing the energy consumption. Saadeldeen et al. [20]
proposed using memristors to construct a branch predictor. Zhang et al. [3] proposed a sparse
directory architecture utilizing multi-level memristors (a resistive memory technique similar to
PCM). Sampson et al. [21] used an approximate technique to improve the performance, density,
or lifetime of multi-level PCM. Our work is unique in that it exploits nonuniform density to
adapt to asymmetric datastructure growth and uses a physical addressing scheme that integrates
well with the cache hierarchy.
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2.6.2 Hashtable Acceleration
A great deal of work has been done to optimize the performance, storage, and scalability of
hash tables. The use of concurrent hash tables [22] is popular which are featured with lock-free
extensive hash tables enabled by techniques such as “recursive split ordering” [23]. There has
been other work to utilize techniques such as the read-copy update mechanism [24] or software
transactional memory [25] to achieve better performance, scalability, or both. Additionally,
there has also been work focusing on novel hash tables, such cuckoo hash [26], for multiple
concurrent writers and readers.
2.7 Chapter Summary
Datastructure accelerations are of great importance in the big data era. Hashtables are
a widely-used datastructure due to their average constant complexity for accesses. How-
ever, when more and more collisions occur, the traditional chaining implementation prevents
two kinds of parallelism: memory-level parallelism and instruction-memory level parallelism.
Multi-level PCM is an emerging memory technique that may be an alternative of DRAM, as
it brings significant density benefits by supporting multiple resistance levels at each cell. In
this chapter, we introduced Herniated Hash Tables, which utilizes the multi-level PCM to store
multiple hash collisions in the same bucket at the same PCM cells. However, the density bene-
fits of multilevel PCM come with the exponential latency overhead when reading more than 1
bit per cell. To avoid this latency, we propose three prefetching options: Off-Chip prefetcher,
On-Chip prefetcher and LLC prefetcher. Experimental results show that Herniated Hashta-
bles can get up to 4.8x density benefits while achieving up 67% performance speedup over
traditional chained hash tables on single-level PCM.
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Lemonade from Lemons: Harnessing
Device Wearout to Create Limited-Use
Security Architectures
3.1 Introduction
Wearout is not a new problem in computer architecture. Flash memories are the most
well-known memory technologies with the wearout problem, and people have been working
on efficient solutions to it for decades. In the big data era, the problem is even worse with
continuously increasing density and capacity demand for memory. The lifetime of a flash cell
dropped from 10,000 times to 2,000 times when the cell dimension scales down from 50nm
to 20nm [27]. Moreover, ITRS [28] envisions many new technologies such as non-volatile
memories (NVM), nanoelectromechanics (NEMS), and molecular devices, to solve the power-
consumption problem in CMOS so as to sustain Moore’s law. However, the wearout problem
also exists in these technologies [29, 30, 31, 32]. The down-scaling from MEMS to NEMS, for
instance, results in exponential degradation of device reliability [33, 34]. Representative NEMS
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contact switches can only work for one cycle to several thousand cycles without failures [33,
35, 36, 37]. As a result, existing research on these emerging technologies has been focused on
how to extend the lifetime before they can really be applied.
Meanwhile, we take a step back and find that wearout can help build purposely limited-
use security architectures. In applications that abusive accesses or adversarial accesses are not
desired, wearout can provide strong security by automatically destroying the device and hence
protects any secure information in it. For example, forward secrecy encryption [38, 39] in
any public key systems [40, 41] (eg. the encryption of e-mail archives) requires a one-time
key for the encryption of each message so that the compromise of a single private key does not
compromise all the past messages. Traditionally, the one-time access of the keys is not enforced
so the system still cannot defend against reusing or stealthy replications of the keys. Taking
advantage of wearout, we can store the keys in a security architecture that wears out exactly
after one access so that the one-time usage of keys is physically enforced and the security of
messages will not be compromised.
However, taking advantage of wearout to create hardware security mechanisms is challeng-
ing. The problems we face in designing the security architectures include:
• How do we design for system-level minimum and maximum usage in the face of proba-
bilistic wearout behaviors of each device and process variations among devices?
• Depending on security goals and usage targets, how should we adjust the parameters in
our design to minimize area and energy cost?
• How do we balance the fabrication cost of more consistent devices (in terms of wearout)
with the area cost of architectural techniques to achieve consistency (eg. redundancy and
encoding)?
In this work, we propose a methodology to create security architectures by harnessing device
wearout. Our contributions are as follows:
39
Lemonade from Lemons Chapter 3
• We use the two-parameter Weibull distribution to model the time to failure of each de-
vice. The two parameters in the model can be used to characterize different kinds of
wearout devices. Manufacturing and process variations among individual devices are
accommodated by introducing more variations into the distribution.
• Based on the probabilistic wearout model, we provide statistical guarantees on system-
level usage bounds by designing application-dependent architectures and exploiting re-
dundant encoding techniques. The system-level usage bounds ensure both reliability for
legitimate users and security to defend against brute-force attackers.
• Extensive engineering space exploration has been performed to study the trade-offs
among target access bounds, area cost, fabrication cost, etc.
In the following sections, we first introduce the wearout devices used in our security archi-
tectures and describe the probabilistic wearout model in Section 3.2. Then we talk about the
threat model in Section 3.3 for three use cases of hardware security mechanisms: a limited-use
connection, a limited-use targeting system and one-time pads, discussed in Section 3.4, 3.5
and 3.6, respectively. Note also, we talk about the limitations of the degradation-based security
measures in Section 3.7. Then we discuss the literature of hardware security in Section 3.8.
Finally, we conclude our work in Section 3.9.
3.2 Device wearout model
3.2.1 NEMS contact switches
NEMS contact switches exhibit promising properties such as nano-scale physical dimen-
sions, near zero OFF-state leakage, and large ON/OFF ratios. Representative NEMS contact
switches are composed of a movable active element and an opposing electrode which interact
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by both electrical and mechanical forces to open and close the switch. When a pull-in voltage
is applied to the active element, electrostatic forces deform the active element towards the op-
posing electrode so as to close the switch. After the voltage is removed, elastic forces pull the
active element away from the opposing electrode so that the switch is open again.
Among other technologies, NEMS are advantageous in building limited-use security archi-
tectures because they have relatively tight wearout bounds and they are insensitive to harsh en-
vironments [33] including radiation, temperature, external electric fields, etc. Most fabricated
NEMS switches can work properly for only one to several thousand cycles [33, 35, 36, 37].
Recently, NEMS lifetime can be extended up to millions or billions of cycles while at the
cost of scaling up the physical dimensions [42, 43, 44]. The wearout characteristics of NEMS
switches are highly dependent on the materials and structures employed. Generally speaking,
any kind of electrical and mechanical aging, adhesion, fracture or burnout in the active element
or electrode are potentially responsible for the failures of NEMS switches. For example, in
[35], graphene-based NEMS switches were recorded to work over 500 cycles and then failed
because the over-bent graphene was unable to recover. [36] reported that NEMS switches
with silicon carbide nanowires can switch for tens of cycles before the nanowire was stuck to
the electrode. In [45], the silicon carbide cantilevered NEMS switches failed after billions of
cycles because of fracture at room temperature and melting at 500◦C.
Furthermore, due to their insensitivity to harsh environment, NEMS switches can help de-
fend against attacks by varying the dynamic environment. For example, it is hard for attackers
to extend the lifetime of NEMS switches by controlling the operating temperatures, especially
these made of high temperature friendly materials such as SiC. Poly-SiC NEMS switches [42]
were recorded to operate properly for at least 105 ∼ 106 cycles without failures at 500◦C ,
comparable to those at 25◦C. [45] has shown that SiC NEMS switches can operate more than
21 billion cycles at 25◦C while more than 2 billion cycles at 500◦C. However, failures at
25◦C were characterized by fracture while failures at 500◦C were probably caused by melting.
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For security architectures, we assume the lifetime at room temperature (25◦C) as the device
wearout bound. More failures at extremely high temperatures will destroy the device faster, but
will not compromise the secret information in them. At extremely low temperatures (eg. after
freezing), it is hard to extend the device lifetime either because failures from fracture cannot
be avoided. These features have enabled NEMS switches to be applied to security or harsh
environment applications, eg. one-time-programmable FPGA interconnects in [46].
3.2.2 Probabilistic wearout model
In the reliability literature [47, 48], Weibull distributions have been commonly used to
model the failure distributions of electronic devices [49], such as the breakdown of gate oxides
in CMOS [50]. Similar models can also be applied to micro-/nano- scale devices [51]. It has
been shown that the Weibull distribution can accurately fit fracture-strength data of emerging
materials for NEMS/MEMS [52, 53], fracture-test data of cantilever beam MEMS [54], and
tensile-strength data sets of carbon nanotubes [55].
Hence, we take the general two-parameter Weibull distribution to model the failure distri-
bution of NEMS switches in this work. Assume that x represents the time to failure. Then the
probability density function (PDF) of the time to failure is:
f (x) =
β
α
( x
α
)β−1
e−(
x
α )
β
(3.1)
and the cumulative density function (CDF) is:
F (x) = 1− e−( xα )
β
(3.2)
Based on the CDF, the reliabity function is derived as follows:
R(x) = 1−F (x) = e−( xα )
β
(3.3)
In all of the above equations, α is the scale parameter and β is the shape parameter. The two
parameters can be estimated by fitting the lifetime data of a large population of similar devices.
α approximates to the mean time to failure, and β mainly determines the variation of reliability
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Figure 3.1: Weibull wearout model with different shape parameters. The red lines (β = 12)
show the lifetime plots of MEMS devices [56] with geometrical variations.
degradation among these devices.
Figure 3.1 shows the failure PDF (Equation 3.1) and reliability function (Equation 3.3)
with different β s. The variation of α will only change the axis scales. β is usually larger
(sharper peaks in the PDF) with more homogeneous devices in which the wearout happens
more consistently.
Since the manufacturing processes are less mature at nano-scales, we accommodate the
process variations in αs and β s. Typically, process variations will result in lower β s. Trevor
S. Slack et al. [56] has simulated Weibull lifetime models of MEMS devices considering ge-
ometrical variations, material variations in elastic modulus, resistance stress, etc. According
to their simulation results, αs and β s are 2.6 million cycles and 12.94 with only geometrical
variations, 2.2 million cycles and 7.2 with material elasticity variations, 1.8 million cycles and
8.58 with material resistance variations. We will experiment with various αs and β s for an
extensive engineering space exploration in later sections.
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3.3 Threat model
Since our target devices are often mobile devices, we assume the attacker has physical
access to the device. In the cases of the limited-use connection and targeting system, we want
to defend against brute-force attacks to decrypt the device by physically limiting the number
of accesses to the storage decryption key. The cracking approaches we target are professional
attacks that can exploit the nonuniform guessability in real-world passwords [57], as discussed
in Section 3.4.1.
In the case of one-time pads, we want to defend against stealthy replications of device (the
archaically named “evil maid attack”). The attackers may clone the one-time pads and make
two copies, one copy to replace the receiver’s original one and another copy for themselves to
break the encryption in the future message transmission between the sender and receiver. Our
secure architectures will resist cloning by making it difficult for attackers to ever read the entire
contents of the device memory.
In this work, we assume the chip fabrication is trusted. And we leave as future work
techniques to allow secure, one-time programming of our devices by end users. We assume
the secret information is one-time programmed in the device memory at fabrication time and
end-users will only need read operations through the NEMS network.
3.4 A Limited-use connection
Apple iOS has developed many security features with integrated secure software and hard-
ware support. However, to keep the devices easy to use, the most straightforward way to
protect the devices is to use a passcode that is configurable by users. To protect the passcode
from brute-force attacks, iOS provides several mechanisms [58]: 1) it automatically wipes out
all data on the device if someone has consecutively failed 10 times in unlocking the device. 2)
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it has incremental time delays after each incorrect passcode attempt.
However, all these guarding mechanisms are recently reported to be easily bypassed. A
company called MDSec [59] managed to bypass the internal counter in iPhone by cutting its
power right before the counter is incremented, while still getting the passcode validation re-
sult. Therefore, the counter never gets updated and the attacker can break the passcode as fast
as the hardware can support. [60] demonstrated similar attack to the counter through NAND
mirroring. An iPhone 5c was forced to power down and recover from a backup NAND mem-
ory to restore the previous state once every a few passcode attempts, which enabled unlimited
attempts to crack the passcode. Another hacking case exploited firmware updates [61]. iPhone
can launch firmware updates automatically without the passcode, which means that the guard-
ing mechanisms are disabled or the counter is disabled during the updates. Then brute-force
attacks can easily succeed, especially with real-world biased passcodes.
Although some vulnerabilities mentioned above have been patched, the real problem with
software solutions is that they can not prevent unknown vulnerabilities. Therefore, we propose
to exploit NEMS switches to build a limited-use connection that can physically limit the num-
ber of accesses to the storage decryption key. The right passcode and the storage decryption
key are needed to successfully decrypt the device storage and thus validate the passcode. We
enforce a traversal to the limited-use connection before each read of the storage encryption
key. After each passcode attempt, the failure probability of the connection increments. After
a certain number of accesses, the connection will wear out automatically and the smartphone
will be locked forever. Compared with security patches, our solution provides strong hardware
enforced security, which cannot be compromised even under government’s intervention.
In Section 3.4.1, we talk about the design principles and design options for the limited-
use connection using NEMS switches. And we discuss system integration issues with NEMS
switches in Section 3.4.2. Finally, we explore the engineering space given the design options
in Section 3.4.3.
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Figure 3.2: Design options for the limited-use connection using NEMS switches. Fig 3.2a
uses N copies of single NEMS switches. Fig 3.2b uses N copies of n NEMS switches in
series. Fig 3.2c uses N copies of n NEMS switches in parallel. Fig 3.2d uses same parallel
structures but with redundant encoding.
3.4.1 Using wearout to build a limited-use connection
The design of the limited-use connection needs to follow two principles:
• The connection should work reliably for all legitimate accesses during the smartphone’s
lifetime.
• The connection should wear out before attackers have high probabilities to guess the
passcode.
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As an example, we calculated the legitimate access bound (LAB) for a smartphone approxi-
mately as follows:
LAB = 5∗365∗50 = 91,250 (3.4)
If the real LAB is several times larger than that, we provide M-way replication of our entire
architecture to scale the LAB by a factor of M, as described in Section 3.4.1.
The main challenge in designing the security architectures is how to control the system-
level reliability degradation window [t1, t2], as indicated in the two principles. The lower bound
t1 should be greater than the LAB while the upper bound t2 should be less than the minimum
guesses needed to crack any passwords. According to Blase Ur et al.’s work of measuring real-
world password guessability [57], professional attackers usually try passwords in the order of
empirical popularity. For 8-character passwords including characters from all different classes
(lowercase letters, uppercase letters, numbers, and special characters), only a few very popular
passwords can be guessed within 91,250 attempts. The guessing probability increases to 1%
and 2% with 100,000 and 200,000 attempts, respectively.
In the following sections, we first attempt to design security architectures that wear out as
quickly as possible after the LAB. We focus on seeking for architectural techniques that can
help control the degradation window. Then we extend the upper bound to 100,000 and 200,000
accesses if the software helps reject the most popular 1% and 2% passwords, discussed in
Section 3.4.3.
According to the design principles, we consider four possible design options, as illustrated
in Figure 3.2. These design options are explained in detail as follows.
N copies of single NEMS switches
With a single NEMS switch, it is difficult to meet the system-level demand of minimum
and maximum accesses. On one hand, the empirical lifetime of a single NEMS switch is
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usually not as long as the LAB. On the other hand, even if there exists such a NEMS switch,
the degradation window expands millions of cycles, as shown in Figure 3.1. Thus, we consider
using N copies of NEMS switches, which can divide the system-level access bounds by a factor
of N. Then the design principles for each copy are adjusted as follows:
• Each copy should work reliably for LABN accesses.
• Each copy should wear out before LABN +1 accesses.
Although the second requirement still requires small degradation windows, the first require-
ment scales the mean value down to LABN . This down-scaling helps create a small degradation
window, as shown in Figure 3.3a.
However, when α is very small, the lifetime of the device is expected to be very small. The
manufacturing and process variability is probably hard to control for such brittle and fragile
devices. We will discuss more architectural options next to avoid such challenges in fabrication
while still satisfying both design requirements.
N copies of n NEMS switches in series
Instead of looking for NEMS switches that can fail extremely fast, we consider chaining
NEMS switches in series to accelerate the wearout, as in Figure 3.2b. In the chaining archi-
tecture, if any single NEMS switch in the chain fails, the whole chain fails. Unfortunately, we
found that increasing the number of NEMS switches in the chain has no significant impact on
the failure rate.
Assume we have n NEMS switches in series. Then the reliability of the chain is:
R(x) =
(
e−(
x
α )
β
)n
= e−n(
x
α )
β
(3.5)
Compared with the reliability function for a single device in Equation 3.3, n devices with α in
series are equivalent to a single device with α
n(1/β )
. Let the denominator equals y: y = n(1/β ).
Then we get: n = yβ . If we want to increase y to scale down α as in Figure 3.3a, then n
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should increase to y12 in each copy with β = 12. To avoid the explosion of NEMS switches,
we discard this option in the following discussion.
N copies of NEMS switches in parallel
Here we propose another technique to control the degradation window, which is exploiting
parallel structures to improve the system reliability before all devices wear out, as shown in
Figure 3.2c. Assuming N copies of parallel structures, the requirements for each copy are as
follows:
• At least one NEMS switch in each copy should work reliably for LABN accesses.
• All NEMS switches in each copy should wear out before LABN +1 accesses.
Assume each copy has n NEMS switches in parallel. The reliability of this parallel structure
is :
R(x) = 1−
(
1− e−( xα )
β
)n
(3.6)
The redundancy in the parallel structure provides error tolerance so that the high reliability
threshold is pushed toward the degradation edge, as shown in Figure 3.3b. With 98% reliability,
the parallel structure with 40 devices can work for the 10th access. With only 2.2% probability
the parallel structure will continue working for the 11th access. In this design option, the
total number of devices may increase, from 91,250 to 365,000 (40∗ (91,250/10) = 365,000)
approximately, but the mean time to failure of NEMS switches is relaxed from one to about ten
cycles.
Parallel NEMS switches with redundant encoding
In this section, we introduce Shamir’s secret sharing mechanism and redundant encoding
techniques to further speed up the degradation of the limited-use connection. Instead of us-
ing highly redundant and reliable 1-out-of-n parallel structures, we require at least k NEMS
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Figure 3.3: Different techniques to control the hardware degradation window
switches working in a parallel structure in order to decrypt the device storage, which results in
a k-out-of-n parallel structure. Increasing k to some extent tightens the wearout bounds of each
parallel structure so that the connection wears out faster. The challenging part, however, is
that the k-out-of-n parallel structure should provide reliable connection when k or more NEMS
switches work properly but wear out quickly when only k− 1 or less NEMS switches do the
same.
To enforce that, we exploit Shamir’s secret sharing mechanism and redundant encoding
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techniques. The general idea is the following: We encode the storage decryption key into n
components and spread them in n read-destructive storage connected by the NEMS switches in
a parallel structure. The encoding mechanism enforces that at least k components are needed
to successfully get the key while no knowledge about the key will be revealed with less than k
components.
Shamir’s secret-sharing scheme
Shamir’s secret-sharing scheme [62] constructs fast degradation codes. One of its classical
scenarios is the secret sharing among many people. On one hand, the scheme allows efficient
and reliable secret sharing if at least k out of n people authorize accesses to the secret. On
the other hand, the scheme prevents leaking any information about the secret if there is only
authorization from k− 1 people or less. The scheme is also called a (k,n) threshold scheme
and its reliability degrades immediately at k− 1. Unlike classical secret-sharing scenarios
that tolerate partial errors for more efficient sharing (authorizing access with the majority of
people’s permission [62] or matching interests with the majority of attributes [63]), our security
architectures need to tolerate erasures from device failures.
The encoding and decoding in Shamir’s secret sharing scheme is based on polynomial
construction and interpolation. The insight is that given k independent points on a 2D plane,
there is one and only one polynomial of degree k−1 that passes through all the k points. The
encoding algorithm involves constructing such a polynomial of degree k− 1 with the secret
hidden in the coefficients:
q(x) = a0+a1x+a2x2+ ...+ak−1xk−1 (3.7)
With this polynomial, we encode the secret into n points, for instance, q(1), ..., q(n). The n
points are then distributed to n people (or n devices) in the security application. Given any k
points, all coefficients can be easily computed by interpolation so as to recover the secret. With
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k−1 points or less, however, no information about the secret can be inferred.
Error correction codes with fast degradation
Reed-Solomon codes [64, 63] are the error correction version of Shamir’s secret-sharing
scheme and they are commonly used in the error correction of large amounts of data in devices
such as flash disks, CDs and DVDs. Theoretically, other linear codes could also construct sim-
ilar (k,n) threshold secret sharing schemes, but it is hard to reason about the security because
of the hardness of approximating the minimum distance of any linear code [65].
Figure 3.3c shows the reliability of a parallel structure with Reed-solomon codes. With
redundant encoding, the reliability of this security architecture becomes:
R(x) =
n
∑
i=k
(
n
i
)(
e−(
x
α )
β
)i(
1− e−( xα )
β
)n−i
(3.8)
We use 60 NEMS switches in the parallel structure and can relax the wearout bound for each
NEMS switch to around 20 cycles. With k = 1, the degradation window size is about 2, while
with k= 30, the degradation window size reduces to about 1, as shown in Figure 3.3c. With k=
30, the parallel structure provides 92% reliability for the 20th access while only 2% probability
for the 21st access. However, when k is close to the total number of parallel devices in the
structure, the reliability degrades very early that the degradation window is stretched out again.
Assisted with Reed-Solomon codes, we are able to build the limited-use connection with
approximately the same number of devices (60∗ (91,250/20) = 365,000) compared with the
parallel structure without encoding, but we can further relax the wearout bound to 20 cycles.
The overhead, however, includes the encoding/decoding complexity and extra storage for the
component keys.
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M-Way Replication of Modules
A legitimate usage factor of 50 times per day is potentially low for some users, so we
propose to support increasing this usage by a factor of M by replicating our entire structure M
times. The replicated modules must be used serially and each must employ a new password.
In this way, an attacker can only attack each module separately to its upper access bound, but
the user can achieve usage that is the sum of the lower access bounds of all M modules.
The cost of this scheme, however, is that a new password must be chosen when migrating
from one module to another and the storage encryption key must be re-encrypted with the new
password. For example, if we wish to increase usage from 50 times to 500 times per day, we
use a 10-way replication factor, which implies that the user must choose a new password and
re-encrypt storage every 6 months during our target 5-year lifetime of the smartphone.
3.4.2 System integration
To build the limited-use connection in practical mobile devices, we need to integrate the
NEMS network with conventional CMOS. Here we show that the CMOS-NEMS integration
is feasible in the manufacturing process and the CMOS-NEMS interface does not compromise
the security of the device storage.
Manufacturability NEMS devices are CMOS-compatible: they do not require exotic mate-
rials or fabrication flow. In the literature, there have been integrated CMOS-NEMS circuits for
leakage-control and power-gating [66, 67]. A possible integration solution, for example, is to
have NEMS and CMOS circuits in differet layers of the chip with a sandwiched metal layer in
between [68].
Security We bury the secret key many layers below the surface of the chip and only con-
nect that secret key to the surface through NEMS devices. Although there are CMOS-NEMS
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Figure 3.4: The total number of NEMS switches needed with different engineering options
for the limited-use connection.
connections both from the surface to the NEMS network and from the NEMS network to the
deeply buried secret key, the latter connections are difficult to access and thus provide a level
of physical security. Circumventing the surface connections does not help the adversary access
the secret.
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3.4.3 Engineering space exploration
In this section, we talk about the engineering space exploration for the limited-use connec-
tion. Without loss of generality, the discussion will be focused on architectural options using
N copies of parallel structures with or without encoding. As discussed earlier, our goal is to
guarantee the system-level access bounds to protect the passcode from real-world brute-force
attacks. Here we list several parameters in the engineering space of the limited-use connection:
device wearout characteristics, redundant encoding, and system-level access bounds. Next, we
will discuss these parameters and their trade-offs in fabrication cost, area cost, encoding com-
plexity, etc. The experiments are based on numerical simulations with different engineering
options.
Device wearout characteristics
We first choose different αs and β s to characterize various kinds of NEMS switches. Since
α approximates to the average lifetime of devices in the Weibull model, we set α according to
the lifetime of representative NEMS switches as listed in [33], ranging from 1 cycle to 1000
cycles. In the following discussion, we show most of our results with α from 10 cycles to
20 cycles. The redundant encoding technique enables linear scaling with the increase of αs
so that we can accommodate loose wearout bounds with a linear increase of the number of
NEMS switches in the architecture. For the parameter β , we try various values from 4 to 16
according to the Weibull modeling of various kinds of devices in the literature. For example, as
mentioned in Section 3.2.2, MEMS devices in [56] have β s of 12.94, 7.2, 8.58 with geometrical
variations, material elasticity and resistance variations. According to [69], typical β values for
MEMS reliability fall in 0.5 to 5. We try to push β values down (eg. 4) with redundant
encoding to tolerate more process variations.
Then we study how many such devices the limited-use connection requires to meet the fast
55
Lemonade from Lemons Chapter 3
degradation requirement. The results are shown in Figure 3.4a without redundant encoding.
With small αs, the NEMS switches have tight wearout bounds so that small parallel structures
can meet the fast degradation requirement. With large αs, the number of NEMS switches in-
creases exponentially to compensate with the loose wearout bounds (The y-axis in Figure 3.4a
is in log scale). Similarly, with large β s, the NEMS switches are relatively consistent in the
degradation so that small parallel structures are feasible. With small β s, the number of devices
increases dramatically to control the variations.
Given the number of devices needed in the architecture, we estimate the area cost analyt-
ically assuming an H-tree layout of the NEMS switches and wires. The contact area of each
NEMS switch is assumed to be 100nm2 and the distance between switches is assumed to be
1nm [33]. The area cost of representative engineering options are summarized in Table 3.1.
Although loose wearout bounds and process variations can be compensated by investing more
NEMS switches in the architecture to minimize the fabrication cost, the correspondent area
cost also increases significantly. For example, when α is 18.69 and β is 10, the area cost is
0.52mm2, which could be hard to afford especially when we need to deploy the security hard-
ware on mobile devices. In the next section, we demonstrate that we can reduce the area cost
using redundant encoding techniques.
Table 3.1: Area cost of the limited-use connection
(α , β ) without encoding (mm2) with encoding k = (10%∗n) (mm2)
(10.51, 16) 1.27e-4 3.2e-5
(10.21, 10) 2.03e-3 1.3e-4
(19.68, 16) 2.03e-3 1.3e-4
(18.69, 10) 5.2e-1 1.3e-4
Redundant encoding
As discussed earlier, with redundant encoding, we enforce at least k working NEMS switches
in each parallel structure in order to successfully decrypt the key that is required to validate the
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passcode. This encoding technique helps tighten the wearout bounds for each parallel structure
even with NEMS switches that have relatively loose wearout bounds.
Figure 3.4b shows the effect of encoding the parallel structures with different levels of
redundancy. The total number of NEMS switches needed decreases dramatically and scales
linearly rather than exponentially with the increase of device wearout bounds. For example,
without encoding, when α is 14 and β is 8, the number of NEMS switches needed in the
architecture is about 4 billion. However, if with redundant encoding and k = (10% ∗ n), the
number of NEMS switches needed is only about 0.8 million with the same α and β . So, the
redundant encoding helps reduce 4 orders of magnitude in the total number of NEMS switches.
Moreover, it also improves the system tolerance to higher device variations with β = 4. With
k = (30%∗n), however, the decrease in the number of devices needed is negligible so that we
can stop enforcing more requisite components in the encoding and decoding.
We assume the storage for component keys should be proportional to the size of the parallel
structure and we accommodate that in the area cost evaluation in Table 3.1. We do not need
extra logical circuits for the encoding/decoding because they can be done in CPU.
The switching energy is proportional to the size of each parallel structure. Assume the
energy cost for each operation in NEMS switches is 10−20 Joule [33]. When α is 14, β is 8
and k= (10%∗n), the total number of NEMS switches is 0.8 million and each parallel structure
has 141 NEMS switches. Then the energy cost for each access is 1.41e-18 Joule. Since we
use parallel structures, the switching time for each access equals individual NEMS switch’s
switching time, which is around 10 ns [33].
System-level access bounds
If small variations of the system-level access bounds are desired, we can tune the fast degra-
dation criteria to achieve the variation. The fast degradation criteria in previous experiments
are defined as follows: Each parallel structure has at least 99% probability for t accesses while
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at most 1% probability for t + 1 accesses. The reliability of the lower bound can be extended
to 99.99999% (for exponential decrease in the failure probability) with 3x linear increase in
NEMS switches using redundant encoding, in which the minimum 91,250 accesses are guar-
anteed.
More interestingly, if the application has high tolerance to the upper bound of accesses,
then, in each copy, the degradation criteria for t + 1 accesses, p, can be relaxed from 1% to
10%, for instance. We analyze the number of devices needed and the empirical access bounds
when using different degradation criteria, as shown in Figure 3.4c. When we increase p from
1% to 10%, the empirical access upper bound increases from 91,326 to 92,028 accesses, while
the total number of NEMS switches needed is reduced by 40%.
Furthermore, if the passcode is sufficiently secure for many more attempts, we can extend
the upper bound to the minimum guesses needed to crack the passcode. According to [57],
only the most popular 1% passwords can be guessed with at least 100,000 attempts. Similarly,
2% most popular passwords can be guessed with at least 200,000 attempts. We need at least
675,250 NEMS switches to architect the limited-use connection with an upper bound of 91,326
accesses when β = 8 and k = (10%∗n), according to Figure 3.4b. However, with upper bound
targets of 100,000 and 200,000 accesses, we only need 38,325 and 29,200 NEMS switches,
respectively, as shown in Figure 3.4d.
3.5 A limited-use targeting system
Similar to the security enhancement in smartphones, targeting systems can also benefit
from the physically enforced limited-usage of targeting commands. Political alliances change
over time and devices should be used only for the immediate mission.
Targeting systems are usually composed of three functional subsystems: the command
and control system, the communication network, and the launching station. The command
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and control system makes targeting decisions according to the real-time data from radars and
these orders will be encrypted and transmitted securely to the launching station through the
encrypted communication link. Although targeting systems have been designed with a high
priority for security, there are still many vulnerabilities. Cyber attacks are reported that the
hacker can execute commands on a targeting system remotely by either gaining access to the
control system or the real-time communication network [70].
We propose to enhance the security of targeting systems with limited-use security architec-
tures. Since the launching station is remotely operated through an encrypted communication
link, we restrict the maximum attempts to decrypt the targeting commands at the launching
station, which enforces an upper bound to the execution of the targeting commands. By en-
forcing the upper bound, we can enhance the security of the targeting system from two aspects:
1) it prevents excessive usage of the targeting system beyond the original task, 2) it prevents
brute-force attacks to crack the encryption system.
As demonstrated in the limited-use connection use case, device wearout can help physically
enforce the access bounds. Similarly, given an expected usage of the targeting commands in
one task, such as 100 times, we can exploit the device wearout to build an architecture that
automatically wears out after the 100th access to the command decryption key. And we build
the architecture inside the launching system so that every access to the command decryption
key needs to traverse through the architecture. Compared with the limited-use connection use
case, the access bound here is relatively small that a small number of parallel structures are
feasible. And the degradation criteria of the parallel structures should be strict because we do
not want a single unintentional targeting command to be executed.
As a result, our design principles of using device wearout to build a limited-use targeting
system are: 1) the targeting system should work reliably for the expected number of usage,
100 times, for instance. 2) the targeting system should not work for the 101st time. Since the
design goals here are similar as in the last use case, we skip the detailed discussion of design
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Figure 3.5: The total number of NEMS switches needed with different engineering options
for the limited-use targeting system.
options. Figure 3.5 shows the total number of NEMS switches needed with different engineer-
ing options. Since the targeted access bound is relatively small, the number of NEMS switches
needed in the architecture is also reduced by several orders of magnitude compared with the
limited-use connection use case. Without redundant encoding, the limited-use targeting system
needs at least 8,855 NEMS switches with α = 20 and β = 16. The worst case in Figure 3.5a is
842,941 NEMS switches with α = 14 and β = 8. With redundant encoding, the total number
of NEMS switches can be reduced to 810 when k=(10%*n), α = 10 and β = 8, as shown in
Figure 3.5b. The curves are less smooth because of the small usage target. Only 5 to 10 paral-
lel structures are needed in total and small variations in device wearout bounds can change the
total number of parallel structures.
3.6 Using device wearout to build one-time pads
One-time pads [71] are important cryptographic algorithms used in many important sce-
narios as they can provide perfect secrecy [72, 73]. However, to guarantee the perfect secrecy,
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important rules for one-time pads include that there must be only two copies of the keys (one
for the sender and one for the receiver), one copy should be securely transmitted from the
sender to the receiver before message transmission, and the sender and receiver must destroy
each key immediately after each message encryption/decryption [74].
Traditionally, secret keys were written in real paper pads. Paper, however, severely limits
the bandwidth of key distribution. One approach would be to use read destructive memories,
which can share the keys and destroy them after use. They can not, however, resist adversarial
cloning. Attackers may clone the one-time pads and make two copies, one copy to replace the
receiver’s original one and another copy for themselves to break the encryption in future mes-
sage transmission between the sender and receiver (the archaically named “evil maid attack”).
Another approach would be to use Physically-Unclonable Devices (PUFs) [75, 76] to fabri-
cate an unclonable one-time pad. PUFs depend upon process variations in each chip, however,
making it difficult to fabricate two identical chips so that a sender and receiver could share the
pad. We need to both defend against stealthy replications by making it difficult for attackers to
ever access the secret keys, yet offer reliable secret sharing between the sender and receiver.
We propose to use wearout devices to provide hardware enforced security for one-time
pads. In Section 3.6.1, we use decision trees to distribute large random keys as a form of
randomness amplification. In Section 3.6.2, we build hardware decision trees with NEMS
switches to physically enforce the one-time usage of the keys. In Section 3.6.3, we exploit
redundant encoding techniques to guarantee that the receiver can reliably retrieve the key but
adversaries can not. The impacts of engineering options such as decision-tree heights, device
wearout characteristics are discussed in Section 3.6.4.
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3.6.1 Secure transmission of large random keys
In one-time pads, each message employs a new key and the key must be at least as long
as the message. As a result, large keys are required for long messages and these keys must
be transmitted securely before any message transmission. To relax the requirement for secure
transmission of the whole block of random keys, we design decision trees that store many po-
tential keys in their leaves and each key is indexed by a short string about the path information,
as illustrated in Figure 3.6. We assume only the sender and receiver share the right path so that
adversaries can only do random path trials to obtain the secret keys.
As a result, the secure transmission of large random keys is divided into the secure trans-
mission of two parts: a short path string and a decision tree that contains many potential random
keys. On one hand, the secure transmission of the short path string is less expensive compared
with the whole block of random keys. There are many choices for the transmission media and
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people can even memorize it. If using a temporary channel for the short string, there is less
opportunity for adversaries to break it since the transmission time could be very short. On
the other hand, decision trees are implemented in wearout devices on a chip, and the secure
transmission of them is guaranteed by our design with NEMS devices, which will be explained
in Section 3.6.2.
The chip that contains many decision trees (many random keys) is our new set of “one-time
pads” that should be delivered to the receiver beforehand for many instances of potential mes-
sage transmission. Even if the chip is obtained by adversaries, the adversaries still have little
chance obtaining the right random keys without the right path information. Moreover, the de-
cision tree will be destroyed very quickly after one trial because of the underlying wearout de-
vices. We will explain the hardware implementation of decision trees in detail in Section 3.6.2
and Section 3.6.3.
3.6.2 Hardware design of one-time decision trees with NEMS switches
Design principles
To guarantee the security of one-time pads in decision trees, we need to follow the rules
that random strings must be transmitted securely (without stealthy cloning) and destroyed im-
mediately after use. In general, the hardware design of decision trees using NEMS switches is
guided by the following principles:
• At least one path should work so that the receiver is able to use the key at least once.
• Not many paths should work, which will prevent adversaries from getting the key within
limited trials.
• Each tree should be area efficient so that we can maximize the density of one-time pads
on a fixed-size chip.
We build the decision-tree circuit with NEMS switches as intermediate nodes of the tree. On
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Figure 3.7: Schematic graph of the implementation of a 3-layer decision tree using NEMS switches
one hand, to allow the receiver to use the tree at least once, the path to the right random
string should be successful at least for the first time, which imposes a lower bound on the path
reliability. On the other hand, to effectively withstand adversaries’ attacks, the paths should
fail as quickly as possible so that not many of the paths work successfully, which imposes an
upper bound on the path reliability. Similar to the first two use cases, we can physically enforce
the access bounds by carefully engineering the decision-tree structures with NEMS switches.
Hardware design of decision trees
Figure 3.7 shows the schematic of the decision-tree circuit. The decision-tree circuit uses
the short path string as control bits to open up the path to the right random string and sends out
the right random string serially. The intermediate nodes in the decision tree are implemented
with NEMS switches that wear out very quickly, while the random keys in the leaves are im-
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plemented in read destructive shift registers. Simply relying on an array of read-destructive or
one-time programmable devices (eg. anti-fuse technologies), however, would be vulnerable to
“evil maid attacks”. The read-destruction could be compromised if reading with a lower volt-
age. Attackers could also easily clone the devices and bypass the destruction. Our architecture
with NEMS switches on the paths will resist cloning by making it difficult for attackers to get
access to the memory. And we distribute the random keys into many small memory devices so
that it will be hard for attackers to inspect all of them.
As shown in Figure 3.7, one NEMS switch is used at each branch of the decision tree.
Only if all the intermediate nodes along the right path survive after the first access can the
receiver successfully obtain the target random string. If each NEMS switch could only be
accessed once ideally, then accessing each intermediate node should allow you to choose one
path but destroy the other one at the same time since the intermediate switch would fail next
time. As a result, only one access could be made to the ideal decision tree and this decision
tree meets all of our design goals. However, practical NEMS switches are hard to provide
deterministic wearout bounds due to fabrication and process variations. As a result, we exploit
the probabilistic modeling of NEMS switches, discussed in Section 3.2, to reason about the
security of hardware decision trees.
Probabilistic reasoning
According to the reliability model in Equation (3.3), the probability of each NEMS switch
surviving the first access is R(1) = e−(
1
α )
β
. Assume the height of the decision tree is H. Then
the probability of successfully getting through the right path is (R(1))H = e−(
1
α )
β
H . If any of
the NEMS switches on the right path failed for the first access, then no one would ever get to
the right random key.
A successful decision-tree design should enable a successful first access but prevent any
subsequent accesses. The probability for a successful second trial can be throttled by designing
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a high tree or using NEMS switches with tight wearout bounds so as to guarantee the security
and one-time usage of the decision tree. However, under this condition, the probability of a
successful first access is also restricted. We should guarantee that the receiver can succeed at
least once without sacrificing the security at the same time.
One solution to improve the one-time pads’ reliability is to provide multiple copies of the
same decision tree for each transmission. The receiver can get the key as far as the right path in
one copy is successful. However, the challenge of this solution is to avoid leaking information
to adversaries with multiple copies of the same random keys. We solve this problem by exploit-
ing Shamir’s secret sharing mechanism and redundant encoding, as discussed in Section 3.6.3.
3.6.3 Redundant encoding for reliable and secure key transmission
To prevent information leakage to adversaries with redundant copies, we encode the ran-
dom strings with error-correction codes and spread them into different copies. Some copies
may be erased because of the device failures. The receiver can recover the right random string
with a small number of failed copies. The desired feature of the error correction codes, how-
ever, is fast degradation once we get more failures beyond our error tolerance target to with-
stand adversaries’ attacks.
Based on Shamir’s secret-sharing scheme, as described in Section 3.4.1, each random string
is encoded into n component keys stored at the same position of n copies of the decision tree:
S1, S2, ..., Sn. Each random string S can be computed with k or more Si components. As a
result, to guarantee both the reliability and security of random keys, we need to guarantee that
the receiver has close to one probability to get through k or more paths successfully, while
adversaries have close to zero probability to do the same. The main difference between the
receiver and adversaries is that we assume adversaries have no knowledge about the right path
information.
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Probabilistic modeling of successful one-time pads
Given the redundant encoding technique, we can calculate the receiver’s success probability
and adversaries’ success probability analytically. The receiver’s success probability on one
copy is:
S(1)recv = e−(
1
α )
β
H (3.9)
The probability of getting at least k out of n copies successfully is:
S(k+)recv =
i=n
∑
i=k
(
n
i
)(
S(1)recv
)i(
1−S(1)recv
)(n−i)
(3.10)
For adversaries, we first consider that they can get through x paths successfully out of n copies.
Then, we need to calculate the success probability of k or more out of x being the correct path,
with the probability of each successful path being the correct path as follows (since there are
2(H−1) paths in total):
P =
1
2(H−1)
(3.11)
The adversaries’ success probability for getting through one path in one copy is:
S(1)adv = e
−( 1α )
β
H (3.12)
The probability of getting through x paths in n copies is:
Prob(x) =
(
n
x
)(
S(1)adv
)x(
1−S(1)adv
)(n−x)
(3.13)
The probability that k or more out of x successful paths are the right paths is:
Probx(k+) =
i=x
∑
i=k
(
x
i
)
Pi(1−P)(x−i) (3.14)
The probability of getting at least k out of n copies successfully for adversaries is:
S(k+)adv =
x=n
∑
x=k
(Prob(x)Probx(k+)) (3.15)
, in which k ≤ x≤ n.
The engineering goal for one-time pads in decision trees is to make sure that S(k+)recv is close
to one and S(k+)adv is close to zero. Parameters in the above equations such as H, α , β , n, k
will be discussed in Section 3.6.4 for trade-offs among fabrication cost, area cost, encoding
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complexity, etc.
3.6.4 Engineering space exploration
In this section, we explore the engineering space that can 1) guarantee the success of one-
time pads (in both security and reliability) and 2) reduce the fabrication cost and area cost.
We first use a specific type of NEMS switch with an expected lifetime of 10 cycles: α = 10
and β = 1. We can deal with high process variations (small β s) because only the reliability
of the first access can affect receiver’s and adversaries’ success probability. For each key
transmission, we use 128 copies of the same decision tree (n = 128).
Redundancy levels
Redundancy levels and encoding complexity will be reflected in the values of k. The re-
ceiver’s and adversaries’ success probability with different ks and tree heights Hs is presented
in Figure 3.8. The intersection of the red area in Figure 3.8a and the blue area in Figure 3.8b
is the success space for one-time pads. With high redundancy, the secret is easy to recover.
In contrast, with low redundancy, the access to the secret becomes more difficult since only
receiving enough components can help recover the secret. As a result, low redundancy leads to
high security. As shown in Figure 3.8a and Figure 3.8b, both receiver’s and adversaries’ suc-
cess space shrink quickly with the increase of k (decrease of redundancy) but adversaries fail
faster. Moreover, when both n and k increase, the complexity of encoding and decoding ran-
dom strings increases because the latency for constructing and solving the polynomial systems
increases.
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Figure 3.8: Success probability with different tree heights and ks (redundancy levels). The
intersection of the red area in the left figure and the blue area in the right figure is one-time
pads’ success space for both reliability and security.
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Figure 3.9: Success probability with different wearout bounds (MTTFs) and tree heights.
Tree heights
Higher trees can also enhance the security of one-time pads because 1) the path to the
random keys gets longer so that the probability of getting through all the nodes along the path69
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for both the receiver and adversaries becomes smaller, and 2) the number of paths increases
exponentially so that it is even harder for adversaries to get on the right path. In Figure 3.8a,
the receiver’s success area shrinks when the tree height increases. However, in Figure 3.8b, the
tree height can effectively block adversaries. When the tree height is 8 or more, the adversaries’
success probability reduces to zero even if the redundancy level is very high (k is close to 0).
In summary, redundancy provides reliability for the receiver and the tuning of redundancy
levels can trade encoding/decoding performance for security. And higher trees can be exploited
to further improve the security of one-time pads, while with higher area and performance cost.
In Figure 3.8, we used a specific type of NEMS switch in which the mean time to failure
is about 10 cycles. This can achieve a large success space for one-time pads. However, such
NEMS switches may be expensive to fabricate to enforce the wearout fast and under control.
Figure 3.9 shows the impacts of different device wearout bounds defined by the mean time to
failure or α values. With higher αs, both the receiver and adversaries have a higher probability
of getting the right key. To ensure security, we need higher trees or less redundancy to com-
pensate for the loose wearout bounds of devices. We can see the trade-off between tree heights
and wearout bounds when H ≤ 7: higher trees compensate for looser wearout bounds. When
H ≥ 8, the tree height can effectively withstand any adversaries’ attacks. Lower device varia-
tions (larger β s) lead to smaller wearout windows. When the target access bound is only one
cycle, larger β s postpone the wearout so they do not help ensure security, which also indicates
high tolerance to process variations while offering high reliability for the sender and receiver.
3.6.5 Evaluation
Given the design of hardware one-time pads in decision trees, we want to evaluate how
many times a single 1mm2 chip can be used for message transmissions between the sender and
receiver. We also want to evaluate the latency and energy cost for retrieving a key each time.
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Figure 3.10: Density estimate
We assume an H-tree layout for the decision tree circuit. The area cost of a complete binary
tree in H-layout is at the order of the number of leaves in the tree if nodes are separated with
unit distance [77]. Given that the height of each decision tree is H, there are 2(H−1) leaves.
We assume 100nm2 for the dimension of each NEMS switch [51, 78, 33]. Then the area
cost for the decision tree is about 100 ∗ 2(H−1)nm2. The area cost for shift registers is linear
to the size of random strings. The size of each random string is assumed to be proportional
to the tree height, that is, around 1000H bits. Then the area cost for all the shift registers is
2(H−1) ∗1000H ∗50nm2, assuming a 50nm2 cell in the registers.
The number of decision trees we can accommodate in the chip is calculated, as shown in
Figure 3.10. If H = 4 and N = 128, then we can transmit around 4,687 one-time pads in this
chip.
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Latency and energy cost
The latency to retrieve a random key is proportional to the path length and number of
decision-tree copies: lat = αHN, with α being the delay of a single NEMS switch, at the
order of 10 ns [33]. If N = 128 and H = 4 as in our previous example, the latency to get to
the random strings is around 0.00512ms in the worst case. The latency for reading the random
string out from the shift register is proportional to the length of the random string. We assume
that the propagation delay per bit is around 20ns, such as in MM74HC165 parallel-in/serial-
out shift registers. Then the delay of reading the whole random string out is about 0.08ms
(20ns∗1000H). So the total delay for each random key retrieval is around 0.08512ms.
Similarly, the energy cost on the path to the random string is 5.12e-18 (NH ∗10−20) Joule
in the worst case. The energy cost in reading the random strings out is negligible since only
one read from a shift register is needed after successfully getting through a path.
3.7 Limitations
This is an initial work to exploit a contrarian view of wearout to build limited-use security
architectures. However, more experimentation and discussion on NEMS failure models and
security mechanisms are needed in the future.
The primary limitation of the current work is that, even with techniques to decrease system-
level sensitivity to device variation, device parameters must still fall within a specific range to
make system use targets practical. Note also that we reduce sensitivity to the scale parameter
(that represents devices’ mean time to failure) but not the shape parameter (which represents
devices’ variations in lifetime degradation). Furthermore, although the Weibull model is highly
parameterized, we need experimental data to validate the range of parameters that are realistic
of this or other alternative models. Finally, we might compromise the device’s availability for
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legitimate users in order to guarantee strong confidentiality and integrity. An attacker could
purposely degrade the NEMS network through many password guesses to consume the legiti-
mate usage bound, which will hurt the availability for legitimate users. The key issue, however,
is to guarantee confidentiality and integrity of the data after the attacker got access to the de-
vice. In our design, intentional consumption of the legitimate usage bound could only degrade
the device faster, but not leak any information of the confidential data.
3.8 Related work
Hardware security has attracted a lot of interests recently. As mobile and embedded devices
become ubiquitous, attackers could easily get access to the physical devices. In order to achieve
confidential information in the devices, they could exploit any hardware measures to crack the
devices, such as brute-force, reverse engineering, side channels, etc [79]. Researchers have
proposed a variety of countermeasures to defend against such kinds of physical attacks.These
countermeasures can be generally classified into two taxonomies: software assisted approaches
and pure hardware approaches:
Software assisted approaches Many existing hardware security solutions involve the co-
operation of software and hardware [80, 58]. For example, modern smartphones have tamper-
resistant hardware modules (eg. SoC’s secure enclave) to protect the processing and the storage
of the device’s encryption key and user’s confidential information, yet some important security
policies that restrict the usage of the keys are implemented in software. The software interface,
however, could expose security vulnerabilities and compromise the hardware security. Soft-
ware may have bugs that lead to violations of the policy. The device could be reprogrammed,
either by adversaries or under duress, through these software APIs to implement a different
policy. Hence, pure hardware solutions are desired to physically secure the confidential data.
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Hardware approaches Hardware approaches exploit physical device characteristics to pro-
tect the data. The specific hardware measures have been ad-hoc and we summarize them into
the following three taxonomies:
1. Physical disorder based security: Physically unclonable functions (PUFs) and random num-
ber generators (RNGs) are most popular hardware security primitives in this category [81].
They are based on the inherent randomness in each device due to process variations to gen-
erate a unique key for each device for device authentication, IP protection, random number
generation, etc. A variety of hardware technologies have been explored to provide the phys-
ical disorder, such as SRAM [82], DRAM [83], memristors [84, 85], nanotechnologies [86],
etc.
2. Physical degradation based security: This taxonomy refers to hardware measures that en-
force physical usage bounds through purposely degradation of the hardware. [87] created
the first self-enforceable hardware for software and content usage metering. They employed
the aging effects in transistors due to negative bias temperature instability to measure the
time a particular licensed software is used. Similarly, [88] used the SRAM decay phe-
nomenon to measure time for batteryless embedded devices in order to throttle response
rates to adversarial accesses. Recently, [89] proposed a memristor-based neuromorphic
computing system that can resist adversarial learning of the model and data by degrading
the learning accuracy nonlinearly after more inputs are applied to the learning algorithm.
Our proposal also stems from this taxonomy but we tailor the devices’ degradation charac-
teristics to meet the system level usage requirements through a series of techniques. The
methodology can be generally applied to many security architectures where a physically
enforced usage window is desired.
3. Physical destruction based security: Some other hardware approaches can restrict data ac-
cesses through self-destructing circuits. However, most current self-destructing devices can
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only destruct the data, but not the devices [90, 91]. By reprogramming or cloning the de-
vices, all the internal data could be cloned into multiple copies so that the data cannot be
secured. Other self-destructing devices need external operations to trigger the destruction
[92, 93, 94]. For example, DARPA displayed a new chip built on strained glass substrates
that can shatter within 10 seconds when remotely triggered [94]. Nevertheless, our system
wears out automatically without a need for remote control.
Meanwhile, more research efforts are needed in the future to study the general design prin-
ciples, the evaluation and verification methodologies of security architectures that can offer
hardware-enforced security.
3.9 Chapter Summary
In this work, we propose methodologies of using wearout devices to build security architec-
tures. We explored a probabilistic wearout model with Weibull distribution to characterize the
behaviors of NEMS wearout. Based on these characteristics, we design architectures that can
physically limit attacks while accommodating legitimate usage. Three use cases are examined:
a limited-use connection, a limited-use targeting system and one-time pads. We first present a
family of architectural techniques to meet minimum and maximum system-level usage bounds
and characterize the design space in terms of device variability (which affects fabrication cost)
and device count (which affects area and power). Then we use redundant encoding techniques
to improve the security architectures from exponential scaling to linear scaling with the in-
crease of device wearout bounds in the limited-use connection and limited-use targeting system
use cases. In the use case of one-time pads, the redundant encoding (Shamir’s secret sharing
scheme) can effectively throttle the possibility of leaking secret information to adversaries and
thus guarantee both reliability and security of one-time pads.
Overall, we envision new opportunities for physically limiting vulnerability to attacks
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through careful engineering of intentional device wearout.
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Chapter 4
Memory Cocktail Therapy: A General
Learning-Based Framework to Optimize
Dynamic Tradeoffs in NVMs
4.1 Introduction
The traditional memory systems based on DRAM technologies have been facing increasing
challenges due to DRAM scaling issues. Non-volatile memories (NVM), both commercialized
(e.g., NAND Flash [95]) and emerging ones (e.g., PCM [96, 97], ReRAM [98] and NEMS [33,
99]), are considered as promising replacements for DRAM. Compared with DRAM technolo-
gies, these NVM technologies offer persistence, much higher scalability and lower stand-by
power and non-volatility. However, there are also disadvantages of these NVM technologies.
Here are two of the most common ones:
• Performance. The write/read access latencies of these technologies are considerably
longer than DRAM’s. As a result, NVM has lower performance than DRAM.
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• Lifetime. These NVM technologies usually have limited write endurance [100][32][30][101].
If without special treatment, NVM will have short lifetime because (some of) the mem-
ory cells will be worn out soon. As a result, special mechanisms (eg., wear leveling [30]
and/or wear limiting [97]) must be used to guarantee the lifetime of NVM memories.
Various techniques have been proposed to combat the performance and lifetime issues of
NVMs [102, 32]. Unfortunately, the goals of boosting performance and prolonging lifetime
are often in opposition. For example, write cancellation [1][103], which is an effective tech-
nique to improve the NVM performance by prioritizing the reads over writes, results in extra
writes to the NVM, thus shortening the lifetime. On the contrary, using slower and less destruc-
tive writes [32] can improve the NVM lifetime, but at the expense of lower memory system
performance.
Intuitively, we can use a combination of techniques (some for lifetime improvement, some
for performance improvement) to achieve a sweetspot between performance and lifetime. How-
ever, there are several practical issues to achieve this goal:
• Huge configuration space. The whole configuration space is huge not only because
it may contain multiple techniques, but also because each individual technique itself
contains multiple configurable parameters to control its aggressiveness. For example,
in our experiment, the total configuration space includes 3,164 configurations, which is
magnitudes larger than the configuration space of prior arts [104, 105, 106].
• High sensitivity to applications. The impacts of some techniques are very sensitive
to different applications. As a result, the ideal combination of techniques for different
applications are dramatically different, as will be shown in Section 4.3.3. They differ not
just in the choices of techniques, but also in the aggressiveness of each chosen technique.
• User-defined objectives. Different from several prior proposals that aim at improving a
single well-defined goal (e.g., IPC) [104, 106], the desired tradeoff for the NVM changes
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in different situations. This is especially true when it comes to the lifetime of NVM
memory: some users want the memory to last longer (eg. 8 years) and they are willing to
pay some performance penalty for it; and some other users want the computing system
to run at faster speed even if its NVM system will break down after just few years (eg.
4 years). For these two optimization goals here, the ideal configurations are usually
dramatically different.
To adapt the architectural techniques in NVMs to different scenarios, we propose a general,
learning-based framework, Memory Cocktail Therapy (MCT), which tailors a specific combi-
nation of techniques for each application and user-defined objective function. Specifically,
MCT formulates all different combinations of techniques into a high-dimensional configura-
tion space and then employs machine learning techniques to model the behaviors of different
configurations based on a small set of samples. Given the estimation of all different configu-
rations, MCT selects the optimal configuration that satisfies the requirements specified by the
user.
The key challenge in implementing the framework, however, is to select a near-optimal
configuration with negligible overhead at runtime, and ideally with little modification to the
hardware. We implement MCT so that it automatically reduces the dimensionality of the
configuration space by lasso regularization and uses the selected features to guide runtime
sampling, leading to more informative samples and higher prediction accuracies. Also, we
choose lightweight, yet accurate online predictors such as quadratic regression and gradient
boosting, to predict the behaviors of other configurations based on the samples. Furthermore,
we implement MCT with a lightweight phase detector and fined-grained sampling technique
to accommodate both coarse-grained and fine-grained phases in memory behaviors, which do
not rely on prior knowledge about the phases or significant modifications in hardware (except
performance counters).
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In summary, our work has the following contributions:
• We formulate NVM system design problems with various tradeoffs as constrained op-
timization problems (e.g. maximizing performance under a lifetime constraint). We
motivate the need for machine learning techniques because of the high dimensionality
of the configuration space, the high correlation and nonlinear impacts of configurations
and the heterogeneity among applications. To our knowledge, our work is the first to use
machine learning techniques to solve such problems.
• Rather than applying machine learning as a black box, we first compare various machine
learning models based on their prediction accuracy, computation overhead, convergence
rate, etc., and choose the optimal ones. Then, we improve the performance of machine
learning models by data normalization, regularization, feature selection, and training
with informative sample configurations.
• In addition to machine learning techniques, we use architectural insight to improve our
scheme’s robustness. For example, we observe that the impact of Wear Quota [32] is
difficult to predict. Thus, we exclude it from the learning procedures to achieve bet-
ter accuracy and then use it as the last resort to ensure lifetime goals are met despite
inaccurate predictions.
• The framework can also adapt to dramatic phase changes in memory behaviors by guid-
ing the learning procedures with a lightweight phase detector.
• Finally, MCT manages to dynamically choose the near-optimal NVM configuration with
no hardware modification and minimal runtime overhead. Compared to a NVM-based
system with ideal configurations for different applications, MCT using gradient boosting
achieves 94.49% of the maximum performance and consumes only 5.3% more energy.
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Table 4.1: Trade-offs of NVM and Their Impacts on Performance and NVM Lifetime
Trade-offs Impact on Performance Impact on Memory Lifetime Related Proposals
With or without Write Cancel-
lation.
Using write cancellation usually Using write cancellation shorterns [1][103][32][107][31],
etc.
improves performance. NVM lifetime.
With or without Eager/Early
Writeback.
Using eager/early writeback usu-
ally
Using eager/early writeback
shorterns
[108][109][32],etc.
improves performance. NVM lifetime.
Write Latency VS. Endurance. Using long-latency-high-
endurance writes degrades
performance.
Using long-latency-high-
endurance writes prolongs
NVM lifetime.
[32][110], etc.
Write Latency VS. Retention. Using short-latency-short-
retention writes usually improves
performance.
Using short-latency-short-
retention writes shorterns NVM
lifetime.
[111][112][113], etc.
Read Latency VS. Read Distur-
bance.
Using short-latency-high-
disturbance reads usually im-
proves performance.
Using short-latency-high-
disturbance reads shortens
NVM lifetime.
[114][115], etc.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces NVM architectural
techniques and their impacts on performance and lifetime. In Section 4.3, we provide a case
study of the optimization problem in mellow writes. Then we introduce our framework of
Memory Cocktail Therapy in detail in Section 4.4 and its implementation in Section 4.5. The
experimental methodology and results are presented in Section 4.6. Section 4.7 presents related
work, and Section 4.8 summarizes the chapter.
4.2 Background
Various trade-offs exist in non-volatile memories which can be utilized to improve their
performance or memory lifetime. However, in many cases, the trade-offs used to improve the
NVM performance considerably degrade the NVM lifetime, and vice versa.
In this section, we introduce in detail several representative trade-offs for non-volatile mem-
ories and their impact on performance and NVM lifetime, as listed in Table 4.1.These trade-offs
include:
• With or without Write Cancellation. Write cancellation [1][103] usually improves
NVM performance because it lets read request be served sooner. However, it also de-
grades memory lifetime since it performs more writes to the NVM memory.
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• With or without Eager/Early Writeback. Eager writeback [108] utilizes idle memory
intervals to eagerly perform write operations of data in the last level cache (LLC) before
their eviction, so there is less possibility that the write queue is blocked. As a result, it
usually improves performance, However, it also degrades the NVM lifetime since some
eagerly written back data need to be rewritten before their eviction.
• Write Latency VS. Endurance. The endurance of NVM [32] can be considerably im-
proved if the write operations are performed with lower power and longer latency, thus
the NVM lifetime will be significantly prolonged. However, it also significantly degrades
the performance of NVM due to longer write latency.
• Write Latency VS. Retention. In Multi-Level Cell (MLC) NVM, a write operation
usually consists of one RESET and multiple SETs. Shorter write latency can be achieved
by reducing the number of SETs in a write operation, at the expense of shorter retention
time which requries more frequent refresh writes/scrubs and thus degrades the NVM
lifetime [111][112]. Some proposals also claim that there is a similar trade-off in Single-
Level Cell (SLC) NVM [113].
• Read Latency VS. Read Disturbance. It is also possible to improve the NVM read
performance by using short latency but high disturbance reads [114][115]. However,
this also comes with NVM lifetime overhead, since such fast reads require frequent re-
fresh/scrub the read NVM cells and thus degrade the NVM lifetime.
Based on these trade-offs, researchers proposed various techniques to improve the performance
or lifetime of NVM memory. For example, Eager Writeback [108], Preset [109] and Eager
Mellow Writes [32] techniques all utilize the trade-off of Eager/Early Writeback; also, a large
amount of proposals (e.g., [107][31][103]) utilize the trade-off of write cancellation. Further-
more, to achieve a performance-lifetime sweet spot of the utilized trade-off, nearly all the
82
Memory Cocktail Therapy Chapter 4
Table 4.2: Techniques of the evaluated combined technique.
techniques value discrete continuous
parameters parameters
Default N/A fast cancellation fast latency
Bank-Aware Mellow Writes true slow cancellation slow latency
(bank aware) /false bank aware threshold
Eager Mellow Writes true slow cancellation slow latency
(eager writebacks) /false eager threshold
Wear Quota true wear quota target
(wear quota) /false
Table 4.3: Parameters of the evaluated combined technique.
parameters value
fast cancellation true/false
slow cancellation true/false (true if fast cancellation is true)
fast latency [1, 4]
slow latency [1, 4] (greater than fast latency)
bank aware threshold [1, 4] (in entries per bank)
eager threshold [4, 32]
wear quota target [4, 10] (in years)
Table 4.4: Ideal Configurations for different minimal lifetime constraint of application leslie3d
bank bank eager eager wear wear fast slow fast slow
aware aware writebacks threshold quota quota latency latency cancel- cancel-
threshold target lation lation
4.0 years True 1 True 4 False N/A 1.0 2.0 False True
6.0 years False N/A True 4 False N/A 1.5 2.5 False True
8.0 years True 1 True 4 False N/A 1.5 3.0 False True
10.0 years True 4 True 4 False N/A 1.5 3.5 False True
proposed techniques (e.g., [1][109][32]) are involved with some configuration mechanism to
control its aggressiveness. For each individual application, the ideal configuration of a pro-
posed technique is usually different.
Ideally, if we combine multiple techniques together, the combined technique might achieve
a better performance-lifetime balance than all the individual techniques. However, as will be
shown in Section 4.3.1, the configuration space of the combined techniques will be magnitudes
larger than the configuration space of each individual technique. As a result, it is challenging
to find the ideal configuration among thousands of candidates.
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Table 4.5: Ideal Configurations for different applications
bank bank eager eager wear wear fast slow fast slow
aware aware writebacks threshold quota quota latency latency cancel- cancel-
threshold target lation lation
default False N/A False N/A False N/A 1.0 N/A False N/A
baseline True 1 True 32 True 8.0 1.0 3.0 False True
lbm ideal True 4 True 16 True 8.0 1.5 3.0 False False
zeusmp ideal False N/A True 8 False N/A 1.0 1.0 True False
bwaves ideal True 3 True 32 False N/A 1.0 1.5 False True
stream ideal False N/A True 4 True 8.0 1.5 1.5 False False
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Figure 4.1: IPC, lifetime and energy comparison of default, baseline and ideal configurations.
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4.3 Case study
4.3.1 Mellow writes configurations
As a case study, we focus on solving the optimization of Mellow Writes [32], which covers
a series of techniques that utilize multiple tradeoffs in NVMs (eg. write latency VS. endurance,
write cancellation and eager/early writeback) . In each technique, there are several config-
urable parameters that controls the usage of this technique and its aggressiveness. In general,
mellow writes implements different write latencies and balances between performance and
lifetime by carefully scheduling fast writes and slow writes based on the temporal and spatial
patterns in the memory system.
• Default. Normal is the default technique which uses fast (normal) writes. There are two
configurable parameters with the default technique: fast cancellation and fast latency.
The former one indicates whether to use write cancellation for fast writes, and the latter
one is the normalized speed used for fast writes.
• Bank-Aware Mellow Writes (bank aware). This technique issues slow writes when
the current memory bank is not busy. There are three parameters with this option:
slow cancellation, slow latency and bank aware threshold. The first parameter indi-
cates whether to use write cancellation for slow writes. The second parameter is the
normalized speed of slow writes. The third parameter controls the aggressiveness of
Bank-Aware Mellow Writes: when the number of requests to the corresponding bank in
the write queue is less than bank aware threshold, we issue the current write request as
a slow write. A higher bank aware threshold usually results in longer NVM lifetime but
lower performance.
• Eager Mellow Writes (eager writebacks). This technique eagerly writes back dirty data
in the LLC to NVM memory when it is not busy. It has three parameters: slow cancellation,
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slow latency and eager threshold. The first two parameters are the same with Bank-
Aware Mellow Writes. The third parameter, eager threshold, controls the aggressiveness
of Eager Mellow Writes: If the highest N LRU stack positions of last level cache (LLC)
contributes less than 1eager threshold total hits in LLC, then we consider these N LRU stack
positions to be useless and their corresponding LLC dirty entry can be eagerly written
back. A higher eager threshold usually corresponds to higher performance but shorter
NVM lifetime.
• Wear Quota (wear quota). This technique divides the execution into multiple small
time slices and assigns a wear quota to each slice. If at the beginning of time slice
the accumulated wear quota is reached, the whole coming time slice can only use the
slowest writes (in our implementation, 4×) and write cancellation is enforced. The pa-
rameter used here is wear quota target (in years), which indicates the target lifetime of
Wear Quota technique. A larger wear quota target enforces longer NVM lifetime, at the
expense of a lower system performance.
4.3.2 Objective tradeoffs
Since NVM systems face multiple constraints (e.g., performance, lifetime and possibly
energy [116] as in embedded systems and data centers), the optimization objectives are usually
complex and user-defined. In our case, there are three optimization goals: first, the qualified
configurations must guarantee a minimum lifetime; then, our goal is to achieve an IPC as high
as possible; finally, among all the qualified configurations whose IPCs are within 95% of the
maximum, we choose the one with the lowest system energy as the optimal configuration. Let
Pi,Ti,Ei represent IPC, lifetime, and energy respectively of configuration i, ∀i ∈ (0,N). Then
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the optimization problem can be formalized as follows:
min
i∈(0,N)
Ei
subject to Ti ≥ t,
Pi ≥ 0.95×P∗
Although we focus on optimizing IPC and energy efficiency under lifetime constraints in our
case study, our framework could be generally applied to optimization problems under other
constraints, eg. by switching the three metrics: IPC, lifetime and energy from constraints to
objectives and vice versa. For example, in embedded systems, the objectives could be to en-
force a constraint on energy, while maximizing performance and lifetime. In data centers,
however, the objectives could be to guarantee a performance target, while maximizing lifetime
and minimizing energy. Our learning framework is flexible with user-defined objective func-
tions since the main challenge we want to solve is to model performance, lifetime and energy
of all different configurations based on a small number of samples, yet at negligible cost at
runtime.
4.3.3 Challenges
The optimization problem (i.e., choosing the optimal configuration) is trivial if we have
the data for all configurations: [Pi,Ti,Ei], ∀i ∈ (0,N). However, in this section, we will show
that it is impractical to do so for three reasons: huge configuration space, high sensitivity to
applications and high sensitivity to user defined objectives.
Huge Configuration Space
As mellow writes covers a series of techniques and multiple tradeoffs, the whole config-
uration space is non-trivial, as is shown in Tables 4.2&4.3. To reduce its size, we add three
constraints to remove impractical configurations:
87
Memory Cocktail Therapy Chapter 4
• The parameters are used only when it is enabled by the selected techniques. For example,
when eager writebacks technique is not selected, eager threshold is meaningless and
thus not considered.
• The slow latency must be larger than fast latency.
• When fast cancellation is true, we force slow cancellation to be true. Prior work [32]
shows that write cancellation for slow writes is more effective in improving performance
compared with write cancellation for fast writes. Therefore, it does not make sense to
have a technique which offers write cancellation for fast writes, but not for slow writes.
However, even with these constraints, the configuration space of Mellow Writes is still huge—
there are 3,164 different configurations in total. Brute-force search of the whole configuration
space is very expensive. In our experiments, in order to compare our framework with the ideal
configuration, we simulate all the configurations for 10 applications , which consumed more
than 300,000 computing hours. The high evaluation cost makes the selection of the optimal
configuration at runtime quite challenging.
High Sensitivity to User Defined Objective
The choice of optimal configuration is highly affected by the user defined objective. For
application leslie3d, we vary the minimal lifetime requirement from 4 years to 10 years. The
results are shown in Table 4.4. Due to the experiment time constraint, we explored a limited
configuration space without the usage of Wear Quota for this table, but the results clearly
indicate that the optimal configuration varies with different user defined objectives.
High Sensitivity to Applications
Not only does the optimization objective affect the choice of optimal configuration, but also
the currently executed application. Figure 4.1 shows the optimal under the default optimiza-
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tion objective (i.e., 8-year lifetime, an IPC within 95% of the maximum IPC while minimizing
energy). For comparison purposes, we also have two representative configurations: default,
which does not use any mellow writes techniques; and baseline, which is the static configura-
tion used in prior work [32].
We can see that, the effectiveness of baseline configuration is far from ideal—for more than
half of the applications, the performance of baseline is significantly lower than ideal. However,
as is shown in Table 4.5, finding out the ideal configurations is certainly not an easy task. In
fact, in all the ten evaluated applications, none of them share the same ideal configuration.
4.4 Memory Cocktail Therapy
To address the challenges and solve the constrained optimization problem as discussed in
the case study, we propose Memory Cocktail Therapy, a general, learning-based framework to
dynamically model IPC, lifetime and system energy of different combinations of techniques
for each application. We first formalize the problem in Section 4.4.1 and then quantitatively
analyze the problem complexity in Section 4.4.2. The high complexity of our problem space
indicates that statistical modeling is necessary, therefore we investigate various learning algo-
rithms and evaluate their performance and computational overhead in Section 4.4.3. Finally,
in Section 4.4.4 we further improve the accuracy of selected learning algorithms based on the
insights from both machine learning and computer architecture perspectives.
4.4.1 Problem Formalization
We formulate the configuration space and tradeoff space to have a well-defined interface
(inputs and outputs) for learning and optimization procedures.
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Configuration Space
We represent all configurations with 10-dimensional vectors:
x =

bank aware
bank aware threshold
eager writebacks
eager threshold
wear quota
wear quota target
f ast latency
slow latency
f ast cancellation
slow cancellation

(4.1)
For example, the following vector, [1,1,1,32,0,0,1.5,3.0,0,1]T represents a combination of
techniques that uses bank-aware mellow writes with a threshold of 1, eager writebacks with
an eager threshold of 32, fast and slow write latencies of 1.5x and 3.0x, and write cancellation
only on slow writes.
Tradeoff space
We include three metrics in the objective space: IPC, lifetime and system energy, as dis-
cussed in 4.3.2. Therefore, we formulate the tradeoff space into 3-dimensional vectors:
y =

IPC
li f etime
system energy
 (4.2)
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Application Top-3 most effective features
lbm
− f ast latency,
+ f ast latency2,
+slow cancellation2
leslie3d
+slow cancellation2,
−eager writebacks∗ slow cancellation,
+eager writebacks∗ f ast latency
GemsFDTD
+slow cancellation2,
−slow latency∗ slow cancellation,
+slow latency
stream
− f ast latency,
+slow cancellation2,
−eager writebacks∗ f ast latency
Table 4.6: Most effective quadratic features in different applications
4.4.2 Quantitative analysis of the problem space
To demonstrate the problem complexity, we quantify the impacts of different input param-
eters and their correlation. We fit the training data to a quadratic regression model with lasso
regularization, which show high prediction accuracy in later experiments. More details about
the model will be introduced in Section 4.4.3. In this model, the input parameters are extended
to quadratic features including both single knobs and knob pairs. The post-training weights of
these features indicate their effectiveness and impacts on the outputs.
Then, we rank the top-3 most effective features for different applications, as shown in
Table 4.6. From the effectiveness ranking results, we can see that: 1) some of these top-
ranked features are knob pairs, which indicates high correlation between input parameters and
the importance of their correlation. Thus, it is necessary to model the joint contribution of
these parameters to the outputs. 2) different applications have entirely different top-ranked
knobs/knob-pairs, so it is difficult to determine the effectiveness order statically. 3) single
knobs can have nonlinear impacts on the outputs (e.g. fast latency on lbm). Note also, we
have a minimum lifetime constraint in the optimization problem. As a result, it is difficult
to determine the best value for each knob to satisfy the lifetime constraint while maximizing
performance and energy efficiency without statistical modeling.
Therefore, we exploit machine learning techniques to model the relationship between con-
figurations and the outputs, as discussed in the next section.
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Figure 4.2: Convergence rates and prediction accuracies using different models
4.4.3 Learning performance, lifetime and energy
To model performance, lifetime and energy, we investigate three learning algorithms: 1)
Regression, 2) Boosting algorithms, 3) Hierarchical Bayesian models.
Regression models the functional relationship between configuration vectors and objective
vectors, based on a small set of sample configurations. One drawback of regression is overfit-
ting, which can happen when the model has many parameters (e.g., higher-order polynomials).
Regularization reduces model complexity to avoid overfitting. Lasso, the least absolute shrink-
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age and selection operator, is a common regularization technique [117]. We will show that by
using lasso, we can speed up the convergence of regression-based predictors (in Figure 4.2), as
well as guide the feature selection for more informative runtime sampling (in Figure 4.4).
Boosting algorithms are a class of ensemble learning methods combining multiple weak
learners into a strong learner [118]. Gradient boosting is a state-of-art boosting algorithm for
learning regression models [119, 120]. It is also one of the most accurate methods for our data
sets as shown later.
Hierarchical Bayesian models do not learn the functional relationship between inputs
and outputs, but assume that some latent variables are shared between different applications
and learning their posterior distributions allows predictions for the current application [121].
Rather than overfit, this model uses only similar applications to predict new application be-
havior; however, accuracy requires that the training set has sufficient breadth to find known
applications that correlate with the new application.
Model selection
Table 4.7 and Figure 4.2 compare these models in terms of (1) requirements for online or
offline data, (2) computation overhead (in microseconds), (3) convergence rates (in samples),
and (4) prediction accuracies. We use coefficient of determination as our accuracy metric:
acc = max
(
0,
(
1−
∥∥(Y ′−Y )∥∥22∥∥(Y −Y )∥∥22
))
(4.3)
where Y
′
represents the prediction, Y represents the true data and Y represents the mean of
the true data. The coefficient of determination measures the proportion of the variance in
dependent variables that can be predicted by independent variables; a commonly used metric
to evaluate prediction accuracy [122]. The computation overhead is tested on a 12-core Intel
i7 processor with 64 GB memory.
The offline predictor averages data from training applications to predict the current applica-
93
Memory Cocktail Therapy Chapter 4
Predictors Need offline data? Need online data? Computation overhead
offline Yes No 0 ms
linear model, no regularization No Yes 1 ms
linear model, lasso regularization No Yes 1 ms
quadratic model, no regularization No Yes 3 ms
quadratic model, lasso regularization No Yes 8 ms
gradient boosting No Yes 112 ms
hierarchical Bayesian model Yes Yes 8,000 ms
Table 4.7: Comparison of different models
tion. There is no runtime overhead, but prediction accuracy is low. The Hierarchical Bayesian
model has high prediction accuracy and fast convergence rate on lifetime because of the high
correlation among benchmark applications. However, the IPC and energy predictions are not
accurate because the data magnitudes vary significantly among different applications. The
biggest issue with this model, however, is that it takes 8,000 ms to produce a prediction. We
will not focus on this predictor in this work. However, for future work, it is possible to design
specialized hardware for the model to mitigate the runtime overhead. Among online models,
gradient boosting and quadratic regression with lasso regularization both achieve high pre-
diction accuracies on all three objectives and have reasonable runtime cost. Quadratic model
without lasso regularization has difficulty converging before 200 samples. The reason is that
the input vectors are expanded from 10 dimensions to 65 dimensions in the quadratic model, in-
cluding square terms, cross terms and linear terms. Without regularization, the model is prone
to overfitting given small sample size. Linear models are not as accurate as quadratic models,
which indicates that the underlying features have complicated, interdependent relationships to
the targets.
According to Table 4.7 and Figure 4.2, we choose gradient boosting and quadratic regres-
sion with lasso in our final experiments because they achieve high prediction accuracies with
low computation overhead.
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Figure 4.3: Including or excluding wear quota in the configuration space. We take
benchmark lbm from SPEC CPU 2006 as an example and choose 77 sample configura-
tions using feature-based sampling. The xlabels are in the format of: [fast rate, slow rate,
write cancellation (on slow and/or fast writes)]. From left to right, the configurations have
increasing write latencies. Including wear quota adds more complexity to the modeling and
degrades prediction accuracies by 2%∼ 6%.
4.4.4 Improving Prediction Accuracies
Rather than applying existing learning techniques as black boxes, we can make small mod-
ifications to improve their behavior on the particular problem of optimizing non-volatile mem-
ory configurations. We find that prediction accuracy is improved using the following tech-
niques:
Normalization avoids extreme coefficient values for different parameters. We normalize
all the data to the baseline configuration’s measured behavior. This technique improves both the
prediction accuracy and convergence rate; however, the predictor now only learns how different
a configuration is from the baseline. Thus, we periodically run the baseline configuration and
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multiply the prediction data by the baseline data. This method accommodates small system
phase changes and avoids oscillation by using absolute values.
Including or excluding wear quota. We observe that wear quota is a technique that makes
significant impact on the three objectives. Wear quota is a technique to guarantee a minimum
lifetime[32]. It does so by ensuring all memory writes are slow when the fast-write quota for
a period is exceeded. Figure 4.3 illustrates the impacts of wear quota. Compared with the data
not using wear quota, the data using wear quota exhibit higher complexity. Their performance
and energy efficiency is hard to predict when the write latencies are either very low or very high.
When write latencies are very low, wear quota is triggered, resulting in slow writes. When write
latencies are very high, the memory system is intrinsically slow and its performance and energy
efficiency is bad. We observe 2%∼ 6% degradation in prediction performance when including
data using wear quota. Therefore, we exclude wear quota from our configuration space for
prediction. However, we use it as a fixup technique later to guarantee the lifetime target for
configurations whose lifetime were overestimated during prediction.
Feature selection. In the previous discussion, we use random sampling to compare differ-
ent predictors. However, we find that the prediction accuracy increases if we sample based on
prior knowledge about what features are most important in the configuration space.
To find important features, we first manually cluster the 8 features (excluding wear quota)
based on domain knowledge. For example, bank aware and bank aware threshold are merged
into one variable, bank aware, that has 5 levels from 0 to 4. Following this approach, we
compress the original 8 features into 5 features: bank aware, eager writebacks, fast latency,
slow latency and cancellation. This manual compression further aids dimensionality reduction.
The configuration space, however, requires both the usage and the aggressiveness parameter for
each technique.
Then we use lasso regularization to identify important features. Figure 4.4a shows the
coefficients of lasso regression with a linear model. The coefficients of bank aware and ea-
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15 30 45 60 75
Number of samples
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
P
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
 a
cc
u
ra
cy
(b) IPC
15 30 45 60 75
Number of samples
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
(c) Lifetime
15 30 45 60 75
Number of samples
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
Random sampling
Feature-based sampling
(d) Energy
Figure 4.4: Feature-based sampling vs. random sampling on gradient boosting.
ger writebacks are near zero for all objectives of all applications. The three important features
are thus: fast latency, slow latency, and cancellation. The same features in square terms and
cross terms are also the important features in the quadratic model with lasso regularization.
Based on the selected features, we obtain 77 samples by uniformly sampling from the three
primary features and randomly sampling from the left. The feature-based sampling leads to
higher prediction accuracies for all other configurations. For example, the performance of
gradient boosting increases by about 3% on average for all objectives.
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Additionally, the three primary features indicate that our framework is not limited to the
techniques in this chapter. It could be generally applied to architectural techniques in NVMs
that involve these three features [109, 112, 113].
4.5 Implementation
In this section, we discuss how to implement the learning-based framework in practical
NVM systems. There are several challenges in the implementation. First, in real memory
systems, there are various access patterns along time and among different applications. Mean-
while, the performance of architectural techniques varies significantly for different access pat-
terns as they exploit different tradeoffs. Thus, we assume that the sample configurations and
the chosen optimal configuration should run on similar memory behaviors. Otherwise, the in-
formation we learned from the training is not valuable.Second, real memory systems usually
exhibit fine-grained bursty behaviors. However, all the different sample configurations in our
framework should run on similar memory workload. We should schedule these samples care-
fully to avoid discrepancies in their workload. Third, although we have selected predictors
with accuracies higher than 90%, there still exist mispredictions. Nevertheless, the final opti-
mal configuration should still satisfy the hard constraint in the user-defined objective function,
eg. the minimum lifetime target. Finally, we should guarantee that after optimization, our
system will not perform worse than the baseline.
To address all these issues, we exploit a series of techniques, including phase detection,
fine-grained runtime sampling, wear-quota fixup and periodic health checking. Figure 4.5
illustrates the workflow of our framework. And we discuss each technique in detail in the
following subsections.
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Figure 4.5: System implementation
4.5.1 Phase detection
Phase detection methodologies have been widely investigated in system area [123, 124,
121, 125, 126, 127]. Since memory systems exhibit frequent, fine-grained phase changes,
our goal is to implement a lightweight phase detector that recognizes only dramatic changes
in memory behaviors. Our system could tolerate minor phase changes by normalization, as
discussed in Section 4.4.4, and fine-grained runtime sampling, as discussed in Section 4.5.2.
Therefore, we adapt the phase detection methodology in [121] and use Student’s t-test to em-
phasize the detection of dramatic phases. Our phase detection algorithm is as follows:
• Use performance counters to monitor the memory workload (including both read re-
quests and write requests) for every I instructions.
• Keep a history record of the memory workload during the past 1000∗ I instructions.
• Perform the two-sided Student’s t-test for the last 100∗I instructions and the past 1000∗I
instructions based on the mean values and standard deviations of their memory workload.
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Figure 4.6: Phase detection. (I is 1,000,000 instructions and scorethreshold is 15.) Recognized
phases in memory behaviors are marked with red vertical lines, which correspond with the
changes in t-test scores.
The t-test score indicates the confidence in rejecting the hypothesis that the mean values
of the memory workload in the two testing windows are the same. The higher the t-test
score is, the more confident we are to recognize a new phase with respect to the memory
behaviors.
• When the t-test score exceeds a threshold, scorethreshold , we recognize a new phase. Then
we clear off the counters and restart.
We demonstrate the phase detection result of ocean in Figure 4.6. Our phase detector can
accurately capture coarse-grained phases, while tolerate frequent, fine-grained phases.
Note that, higher accuracy might be achieved by providing more program information to the
phase detector. This can be done through either hardware modification (e.g., passing PC with
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memory requests) or application/compiler modification (e.g., generating compiler hints [124,
126, 125, 127]). In this work, the recognized phases shown in Figure 4.6 are sufficient to guide
the learning procedures. Meanwhile, our phase detection scheme only relies on the statistics
provided by existing performance counters.
4.5.2 Runtime sampling
Memory bursty behaviors are common in memory intensive applications (eg. lbm, libquan-
tum, milc, etc.) [128]. If we evenly divide the sampling period into N slices for N samples,
then some samples may fall in bursty periods while others fall in idle periods. To accommodate
these fine-grained memory patterns, we propose fine-grained sampling:
• Assume the total sampling period covers T instructions.
• Run each sample configuration for a small sampling unit, which covers t instructions.
• Loop over all samples for TN∗t times.
• Accumulate statistics of each sample configuration during TN∗t sampling units.
We observe that the magnitude of memory burst length is at least 10 million instructions in
our benchmarks. Hence, all the sample configurations could be scheduled within each memory
burst if we use a small sampling unit, eg. 100 kilo instructions. Note also, the configuration of
sampling unit length and the number of iterations can be guided by the mean memory workload
in the current phase, as discussed in Sec 4.5.1. If the mean value is low, we can use large sam-
pling units so that each sample configuration can make effects with enough memory requests.
Otherwise, we can use small units and repeat many times so that all configurations can evenly
experience all memory patterns.
The fine-grained sampling methodology is lightweight so that it incurs negligible overhead
at runtime. With cyclic-fine-grained sampling, each sample will cover a wide set of memory
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behaviors. And all different samples are exercised on similar memory behaviors. Using the
fine-grained sampling methodology together with the phase detector, our system can accom-
modate both fine-grained and coarse-grained phases in the memory system.
4.5.3 Prediction and optimization
After the sampling period, we collect the IPC, lifetime and energy data of the sample con-
figurations. Then we apply the learning algorithms to predict the three objectives of all other
configurations. After the prediction, we choose the optimal configuration based on the used-
defined objective function, as defined in Section 4.3.2.
However, the optimization based on prediction data may have errors. For example, the
chosen optimal configuration might be overestimated in lifetime while its real lifetime cannot
satisfy the minimum target. To correct such prediction errors, we add Wear Quota to the chosen
optimal configuration and set the Wear Quota target to the minimum lifetime target. Then the
minimum lifetime could be guaranteed. If the chosen optimal configuration could meet the
lifetime requirement itself, adding Wear Quota incurs negligible overhead according to the
prior work. For prediction errors in IPC and energy, we account that in our final optimization
results and compare them with the baseline and ideal policy.
4.5.4 Monitoring and health checking
After choosing the optimal configuration, we can launch the optimal configuration in the
memory system. However, the chosen optimal configuration might be suboptimal in practice
due to prediction errors. Hence, we monitor the performance of the memory system and pe-
riodically switch back to the baseline configuration for health checking. During this stage,
we can perform several health checks of the current system. First, we can obtain the memory
workload statistics for the phase detection. Second, we can check minor phase changes by just
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Table 4.8: Processor Simulation Parameters
Freq. 2GHz
Core Alpha ISA, single-core, OoO, 64-byte cacheline, 8-issue
L1$ split 32KB I/D-caches,
4-way, 2-cycle hit latency, 8-MSHR
L2$ 256KB per core, 8-way,
12-cycle hit latency, 12-MSHR
L3$(LLC) 2MB, 16-way, 35-cycle hit latency, 32-MSHR
Table 4.9: Main Memory System Simulation Parameters
Basics 400 MHz, 4GB, 64-bit bus width, using ReRAM,
assume using effective wear-leveling scheme (e.g., Start-
Gap [30]) in bank granularity which can achieve 95% av-
erage lifetime,
write-through (writes bypass row buffers), 1KB row
buffer, open page policy, tFAW=50ns
# of Banks 16
# of Rows 8192 per bank
# of Cols 512 per row
Read Queue 64 entries, highest priority
Write
Queue
64 entries, middle-high priority
write drain threshold: 32 (low), 64 (high)
Eager Mel-
low
32 entries per channel, lowest priority,
Write
Queue
no write drain, slow writes
tRCD 48 cycles (120 ns)
tWP (WR 60∗wr ratio cycles
pulse lat.) (150∗wr ratio ns).
tCAS 1 cycle (2.5 ns)
endurance 8∗106 ∗wr ratio2 writes;
monitoring the statistics of the baseline configuration. With the normalization technique, peri-
odic statistics of the baseline configurations can help adapt to minor phase changes and avoid
system oscillations. Third, if we find that the performance of the chosen configuration is worse
than the baseline configuration, we can switch to the baseline configuration so that our system
will never be worse than the baseline system.
4.6 Results
4.6.1 Experiment setup
We use gem5[12] and NVMain[129], which is a timing-accurate simulator for non-volatile
memories. Table 4.8 and Table 4.9 respectively report the detailed parameters of processor and
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Figure 4.7: Compare Memory Cocktail Therapy with baseline systems with respect to IPC,
lifetime and system energy.
resistive memory based main memory. We assume the memory system uses an efficient bank-
level wear-leveling technique. Without loss of generality, we use ReRAM[130] for the simu-
lated NVM-based main memory. According to recent represented commercial products[131],
we model the baseline write latency to be 150ns and its endurance as 8×106. We also model
the Write Latency VS. Endurance trade-off [32] in our simulation framework: the write latency
can be extended to 150∗wr ratio ns, as a result, the write endurance can be improved quadrat-
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bank bank eager eager wear wear fast slow fast slow
aware aware writebacks threshold quota quota latency latency cancel- cancel-
threshold target lation lation
static True 1 True 32 True 8 1.0 3.0 False True
lbm True 1 True 32 True 8 2.0 2.5 False False
libquantum True 3 True 32 True 8 1.5 3.0 False True
stream False N/A True 32 True 8 1.5 2.5 False False
ocean True 2 True 4 True 8 1.5 3.5 False True
bwaves True 4 False N/A True 8 1.0 1.5 False True
Table 4.10: Optimal configurations for different applications selected by MCT with gradient boosting.
ically to 8∗106 ∗wr ratio2. For processor and memory systems, we respectively use MCPAT
[132] and NVSim [133] to model their energy consumption.
We run 7 memory-intensive workloads (lbm, leslie3d, zeusmp, GemsFDTD, milc, bwaves
and libquantum) from SPEC CPU2006, ocean from SPLASH-2, and 2 extra microbenchmarks
(gups and stream) which separately provides random and stream memory access pattern. Each
benchmark is warmed up for 6 billion instructions and simulated in detail for another 2 billion
instructions. To calculate lifetime, we assume the system will cyclically execute the current
workload until the main memory wears out, and this total execution time is the memory lifetime
for the workload.
4.6.2 Evaluation of memory cocktail therapy
In this section, we evaluate MCT with respect to our three objectives: IPC, lifetime and
system energy. We compare MCT with three baseline systems: 1) default, which does not use
mellow writes techniques, 2) best static policy chosen from prior work, which uses bank aware
mellow writes and eager writebacks with slow write cancellation and wear quota. 3) ideal
policy, which is selected by a brute-force search through the whole configuration space. We
demonstrate MCT using gradient boosting and quadratic lasso as the learning models without
using wear quota in the learning process. After the prediction, MCT uses wear quota as a fixup
technique for the predicted optimal configuration to guarantee a minimum lifetime target.
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Figure 4.8: Sensivity to different lifetime targets
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Figure 4.9: Sampling overhead
Better tradeoffs between IPC, lifetime and system energy
Figure 4.7 shows the comparison of MCT with other baseline systems. We assume that
the lifetime requirement is 8 years here. And we normalize the IPC and energy data by the
best static policy. The default system only uses fast writes so it achieves high IPC and low
energy consumption. However, it cannot satisfy the minimum lifetime requirement for most
of our benchmarks (except zeusmp). Both MCT and the best static policy can guarantee the
minimum lifetime requirement, while MCT using gradient boosting achieves 9.24% higher
IPC and 7.95% lower energy consumption on average for all the benchmarks. Particularly,
MCT achieves significantly better tradeoffs when the best static policy is far behind the ideal
policy, as in lbm, leslie3d, libquantum, and stream. For other benchmarks that the static pol-
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icy is already close to the ideal policy, MCT performs similarly to the baseline with negli-
gible degradation in performance and energy efficiency. We list the optimal configurations
selected by MCT in Table 4.10. Small variations in the configuration can result in significant
improvement over the static policy. For example, in lbm, the only differences between the
MCT-optimal configuration and the static configuration are in fast latency, slow latency, and
slow cancellation. However, the performance improvement is up to 35%. The main reason
is that, the high slow latency together with slow cancellation in the static policy causes many
rewrites, which hurts lifetime. Eventually, more wear quota slow writes are enforced in order
to guarantee the minimum lifetime target of 8 years.
Compared with the ideal policy, MCT using gradient boosting achieves 94.49% of the
maximum performance with only 5.3% more energy consumption. MCT using quadratic with
lasso achieves 6% performance gains and 5.3% energy savings compared with the static policy.
And it achieves 91.69% of the ideal performance with 8.3% more energy. In particular, it
performs well on most of the benchmarks except stream. This indicates that quadratic model
may not work well for every application depending on the intrinsic memory characteristics
while gradient boosting is more general as it includes a variety of weak predictors.
Sensitivity to different lifetime targets
Figure 4.8 shows the results of MCT with different lifetime targets. We only show MCT
using gradient boosting here. In our experiments, the lifetime targets range from 4 years to 10
years. In general, when we have higher lifetime targets, the chosen optimal configuration has
lower performance and higher energy consumption, and vice versa. MCT can generally capture
this trend. However, there are discontinuities in the predictions, as well as the ideal policies for
different lifetime targets. One reason is that, the set of configurations we experiment on is still
far from complete compared with the oracle, although it already contains 3,164 configurations
and needs more than 300,000 computing hours to simulate for all benchmarks. Nevertheless,
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MCT still manages to select a better configuration than the baseline configuration as in lbm,
stream, lelsie3d, etc. while saving large amount of evaluation time for each configuration.
When the chosen optimal configuration has overestimated lifetime (eg. in GemsFDTD when
the lifetime target is beyond 8 years), the wearquota fixup technique works as the last resort to
guarantee that the minimum lifetime requirement will still be satisfied.
Reduced sampling and learning complexity by excluding wear quota in the learning pro-
cess
Although for some benchmarks (eg. lbm and stream as shown in Table 4.5), including wear
quota in the learning process leads to better choices, there are two practical problems with wear
quota prediction: 1) The prediction accuracies including wear quota degrades by 2%∼ 6% for
all applications, as discussed in Section 4.4.4. 2) Wear quota is a technique that depends on
aggregate memory behaviors in a long period. However, we need short sampling period to
mitigate runtime sampling overhead and fine sampling granularity to tolerate memory bursty
behaviors. Including wear quota in the prediction space adds more challenges in practical sam-
pling methodologies. For example, using the same fine-grained sampling methodology, the
chosen optimal configuration for lbm including wear quota only achieves 70% of the perfor-
mance by excluding wear quota, while consuming 50% more energy. And we observe similar
phenomenon in leslie3d, which has 6% performance degradation with 13% more energy con-
sumption when including wear quota in the prediction.
Sampling overhead
During the sampling period, MCT exercises different configurations in order to model IPC,
lifetime and energy for all configurations. However, these sample configurations are generally
not the optimal one. In this section, we evaluate the overhead caused by running suboptimal
configurations and compare the gains in testing period to the losses in the sampling period. We
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refer the rest of the phase as the sampling period to testing period here.
Figure 4.9a shows the comparison. All the data are normalized by the static policy. On
average, the aggregate IPC of sample configurations is 94.32% of the baseline, while MCT
using gradient boosting achieves 1.09x IPC of the baseline. Similarly, the aggregate energy
consumption of sample configurations is 1.05x of the baseline, while the predicted optimal
configuration only consumes 92.05% energy of the baseline.
Considering the overhead during the sampling period, the practical gains of MCT depend
on the ratio between the testing period length and the sampling period length. As a proof of
concept, in our experiments, the sampling period covers 1 billion instructions and the testing
period covers 2 billion instructions. However, according to prior work on memory workload
characterization of SPEC CPU 2006 benchmarks[128], there are only a few phases during the
whole program execution. And each program has thousands of billions instructions. To have
a better idea about the practical gains, we extrapolate the overhead and gains with different
ratios between the testing period length and the sampling period length. If the testing period is
α times of the sampling period, then the extrapolated IPC is:
IPCtotal = (IPCsampling+α ∗ IPCtesting)/(1+α) (4.4)
Figure 4.9b shows the total IPC and energy consumption by extrapolating gains and losses
based on Equation (4.4). For example, if the testing period is 10x of the sampling period,
which is a reasonable case from the characterization results[128], then MCT using gradient
boosting can still achieve 7.93% performance gains and 6.7% energy savings compared with
the static policy.
Extension to multi-program workloads
We also investigate the effectiveness of MCT in a multi-core architecture. The architecture
has 4 cores, independent L1/L2 cache for each core, a shared 8MB L3 cache and an 8GB,
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Table 4.11: Multi-program workloads
mix1 lbm, libquantum, stream, ocean
mix2 leslie3d, bwaves, stream, ocean
mix3 GemsFDTD, milc, zeusmp, bwaves
mix4 lbm, leslie3d, zeusmp, GemsFDTD
mix5 GemsFDTD, milc, bwaves, libquantum
mix6 libquantum, bwaves, stream, ocean
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Figure 4.10: Memory Cocktail Therapy in multi-core environments.
32-bank resistive main memory. We randomly pick 4 benchmarks and execute them concur-
rently, and then evaluate the performance (in normalized geometric mean IPC) and lifetime
(in years). The multi-program workloads that we experimented on are listed in Table 4.11.
Our results demonstrate that MCT also performs well in multi-program situations, as shown
in Figure 4.10. Compared to the static policy, MCT achieves around 20% (geometric mean)
performance benefits and also satisfies the 8-year lifetime requirement. We only compare
MCT with the static policy for single-core architectures because exploring the design space
in multi-core architectures for comparison is computationally intractable. Meanwhile, MCT
can automatically find a good configuration for the current multi-program workload by only
exercising a small set of sample configurations at runtime.
We found that, multi-core workloads tend to smooth phase behavior out as soon as they
have a least a few programs. Similar results have also been reported in the literature [134].
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That is why MCT also performs well in multi-core environments. The only dramatic effect,
however, is when one or more programs start/exit. In such situations, our phase detection
scheme is still necessary to provide rapid adaptation to this large shift in memory behavior.
The effectiveness and fairness of MCT can be further improved by exploiting multi-program
specific characteristics (e.g., by utilizing the schemes similar to [135, 136]) and we leave it as
our future work.
4.7 Related Work
Machine learning approaches have attracted more interest recently to assist the architec-
ture design as systems and architectures are becoming more complicated. These techniques
have been used for automatic resource allocation [104, 106], branch prediction/LLC reuse-
distance prediction [137, 138, 139], performance modeling [140, 141, 142], etc. For example,
ensembles of Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) were exploited to coordinate the allocation
of multiple interacting resources to different applications and thus optimize the system-level
performance [104]. Reinforcement learning (RL) was used to adapt the memory scheduling
policies to changing workload and maximize the memory utilization [106]. Markov Decision
Process (MDP) was used to model how the RL-based memory controller interacted with the
rest of system.
Particularly, machine learning approaches can provide guidance on how to determine the
optimal architectural configuration for specific applications and targets. LEO [121] exploited
a hierarchical Bayesian model to learn the system behaviors of various processor and memory
configurations and then minimize energy under performance constraints. JouleGuard [143]
employed a combination of machine learning (eg. multi-armed bandits) and control theo-
retic techniques (eg. PI controller) to provide energy guarantees while maximizing accuracy.
CASH [105] also exploited a combination of control theory and machine learning techniques
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to learn fine-grained configurations of multi-core architectures in IaaS Clouds to provide near-
optimal cost savings for different QoS targets.
Our proposal extends the application of machine learning approaches to emerging memory
technologies, which introduced a new constraint in the optimization space: lifetime. The life-
time constraint increases optimization complexity and leads to significantly different optimal
configurations according to our results. Furthermore, compared with prior machine learning
approaches, our framework is very lightweight: it does not require offline training, hardware
modification or OS coordination and it incurs negligible runtime overhead. Also, our machine
learning methodology is very straightforward and can be easily generalized to solve other ar-
chitecture problems.
4.8 Chapter Summary
This chapter introduces Memory Cocktail Therapy (MCT), a general learning-based frame-
work that manages to optimize combined techniques which utilize multiple dynamic trade-offs
in NVM. With minimal performance overhead and no hardware modification, MCT manages
to find the near-optimal configuration for the current application under a user-defined objec-
tive out of thousands of candidate configurations. MCT reduces the dimensionality of the
configuration space with lasso regularization and selects three primary features: fast latency,
slow latency and write cancellation. These are general features in NVM techniques so that our
framework can also be applied to the optimization of other NVM techniques. Moreover, MCT
manages to accommodate both fine-grained and coarse-grained phases by phase detection and
cyclic-fine-grained runtime sampling.
We implement MCT using both gradient boosting and quadratic regression with lasso. We
demonstrate that MCT using gradient boosting achieves better optimization results on aver-
age for all applications. For example, to guarantee an 8-year lifetime, achieve an IPC that is
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within 95% of the maximum, and minimize energy, MCT using gradient boosting improves
the performance by 9.24% and reduces energy by 7.95% compared to the best static configura-
tion. Compared with the ideal configuration in each application, MCT achieves 94.49% of the
performance with only 5.3% more energy consumption (geometric mean).
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Future Work
In this thesis, we explored the opportunities of exploiting emerging technologies to build novel
architectures. We exploited multi-level PCM to provide efficient storage of large-scale hash
tables. We built limited-use security architectures from NEMS switches using self-degradation
measures. And we optimized NVM systems to automatically adapt to different applications and
objectives to achieve the best tradeoff between performance, lifetime, and energy efficiency. In
addition to these architectures, we discuss several future directions of using emerging tech-
nologies in the following sections.
5.1 Hardware support for datastructures
There are other data structures that can benefit from the variable storage in multi-level PCM
except for hash tables. Here we talk about inverted index structures and prefix trees (trie) in
large scale web search engines.
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5.1.1 Scalable inverted index structures in multi-level PCM
Inverted index structures are commonly used in many domains for efficient queries. For
example, in web search engines, the inverted index structure is used to index and search related
documents based on the keywords. Each of the keywords is accessed as the index to retrieve a
list of documents that contain the word. Due to the large number of web documents, the storage
efficiency and query performance of the inverted index becomes critical to the performance
of search engines. Although solutions such as data compression could improve the storage
efficiency, they cannot improve the query performance at the same time.
As the basic organization and operations of inverted index structures are very similar to
hash tables, they can also benefit from the multi-level PCM. First, the popularity of different
words varies significantly, which results in asymmetrically linked document lists in the inverted
index. As shown in herniated hash tables, multi-level PCM can accommodate variable lengths
of lists by expanding the storage on demand in deeper levels of the same memory cells. And
prefetching techniques can help hide the longer read latency of deeper list entries. Furthermore,
the document lists in inverted index structures are usually sorted based on the access frequency
of these documents. To maintain the sorted order of the document list in traditional storage
is more expensive: it is necessary to rewrite the entire document list if the order changes. In
multi-level PCM, however, keeping the sorted order is a free byproduct because the iterative
write mechanism rewrites all the data on every data update. The sorted order will in turn
improve the query performance by alleviating unnecessary data retrieval that are stored in very
deep levels. As a result, we envision higher performance and density benefits for inverted index
structures than general hash table structures.
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5.1.2 Efficient storage of prefix trees
Prefix trees are a commonly used data structure for the efficient search of popular keywords
and phrases. A typical application is the Typeahead service in web search engines: after a
user typed in several characters of the keyword, the search engine automatically completes the
keyword or prompts with several most possible keywords the user wants to search about. In
the prefix tree, each path represents a valid keyword. Each tree node does not store a key value,
but it stores references to all its children who share the same prefix (path to the parent node)
but have different following characters. The auto-completion of keywords basically needs to
scan the prefix tree and retrieve all the paths starting from the node with the prefix.
It is promising to exploit multi-level PCM to store all the children references of each node.
First, although there are always 26 valid characters in English words, the number of popular
suffixes varies largely for different prefixes. We can pack all the references to valid suffixes
in each node in the same PCM cells. Multi-level PCM can compress the storage for each
node and offer in-place expansion for nodes with variable numbers of children. Second, the
access pattern of prefix trees is usually breath-first search starting from a specific node. As
a result, a traversal of all the children references in each node is necessary. Although the
data compression of each node in multi-level PCM may break the fast indexing feature in
traditional array structures, the performance of breath-first search will not be compromised a
lot, especially considering opportunities for prefetching. Third, the prefix tree will be rarely
updated after the initialization, which can avoid expensive write operations in multi-level PCM.
Above all, multi-level PCM can offer dense and non-volatile storage of these prefix trees, as
well as fast queries on demand. It will be interesting to explore the opportunities to improve
the quality of the Typeahead service with such hardware support.
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5.2 Rate Limiting Security architectures
In Lemonade from Lemons, we built limited-use security architectures by harnessing the
wearout phenomenon in NEMS switches: the failure probability of NEMS devices increases
with more switching cycles, which imposes a usage upper bound on the entire system, so as
to resist brute-force attacks. We proposed a series of architectural techniques and redundant
encoding methods to differenciate legitimate users and attackers, by creating a steep boundary
in their probabilities of gaining successful accesses to the device storage. However, there are
inherent differences in their access patterns: legitimate users tend to consume the access quota
evenly every day, but attackers will attempt to crack the device in a very short time. Therefore,
in addition to the number of switching cycles, the frequency of switching operations can also
be exploited to distinguish legitimate users and attackers.
Meanwhile, many NEMS switches are composed of materials with multiple electrical and
mechanical functionalities, such as polymer matrix composites, which also exhibit the ability
to automatically heal the premature facture and reduced durability [144, 145]. To enable the
self-healing, however, the switching rate must be limited so that the devices can recover in
between consecutive accesses. In opposite, the access pattern of brute-force attackers does not
give enough time for the devices to heal premature issues.
The self-healing and rate-limiting features have brought more opportunities to enhance the
security of the Lemons architectures. On the one hand, the self-healing feature can extend
the lifetime of the NEMS network for legitimate users if the user consumes the access quota
uniformly. On the other hand, the rate-limiting effect and potentially accelerated wearout can
throttle brute-force attacks in a limited amount of time. The main challenge will be to model the
self-healing behaviors of NEMS materials and characterize these materials with the required
latency and energy for the self-healing. It will be interesting to analyze the minimum access-
interval constraint to elongate the system-level lifetime.
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5.3 Statistical Inference and Optimization of NVM Systems
5.3.1 Identifying program characteristics that interference with NVM
techniques
From the motivational experiments in the Memory Cocktail Therapy, the optimal NVM
techniques for different applications can be significantly different. An interesting question,
however, is what program characteristics attribute to their preferences for these NVM tech-
niques? For example, due to the tradeoff between the write latency and write endurance in
phase change memories, various techniques attempt to schedule slow write operations in a
best-effort manner, write back early and slowly while not degrading the system performance.
As a result, program characteristics such as the type of data structures, stride access patterns,
update frequencies, etc. may have significant impact on cache-block reuse distance, memory
workload and read/write distribution, and consequently affect the best choice of NVM tech-
niques.
Identifying correlated program characteristics can bring the following benefits to the cur-
rent MCT framework. First, reduce the sample size. In the current framework, we use a general
set of sample configurations (77 samples) learned from all the training applications. To exercise
these sample configurations at runtime causes a performance overhead (the sampling period
takes 1 billion instructions). Given the knowledge of specific program characteristics, we can
rule out some sample configurations that we can predict with high confidence offline and then
focus on exercising those architectural parameters that may have large variance. Second, learn
from training applications without the runtime overhead. MCT did not use the hierarchical
Bayesian model because it is too expensive to train at runtime. Actually, it attempts to learn
the correlation of the target application with other training applications after collecting some
runtime samples of the target application. However, if we can characterize these applications
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statically, we will not need the online training to learn the correlation between applications.
Moreover, categorize applications based on their program characteristics and deploy them ac-
cordingly to heterogeneous NVM systems.
5.3.2 Approximate computing with NVM systems
In the current Memory Cocktail Therapy framework, we introduce three system metrics,
performance, lifetime and energy efficiency. Meanwhile, as applications and data scale, more
and more applications exhibit tolerance to a small amount of errors in outputs. Taking this new
metric, accuracy, into account, we can explore more interesting tradeoffs in NVM systems.
For example, instead of rewriting after a write cancellation, we can keep the partially-written
value in the memory cells if it is close to the target value. Thus, we can avoid the cost at the
system performance and lifetime during rewrite operations. Also, similar learning frameworks
as MCT can help determine the best NVM techniques for different applications adaptively.
The challenging issue, however, is how to provide statistical guarantee on the accuracy
target. The program characterization discussed in Section 5.3.1 can be helpful. The impact
of approximating different program regions on the system performance, lifetime and accuracy
will be different. Hence, the static analysis of the correlation can provide guidance on whether
we should enable the approximation of write operations.
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Conclusion
In this thesis, we have presented three cases of novel architectures using emerging technologies
and demonstrated the value of the statistical design methodology.
In Herniated Hash Tables, we provide hardware-level optimization to traditional datas-
tructures, hashtables, by storing multiple hash collisions in multilevel PCM. The density ben-
efits of multilevel PCM, however, come with the exponential latency overhead when reading
deeper bits within each cell. To avoid the degradation of system performance, we propose three
prefetching options and address mapping techniques. Experimental results show that Herniated
Hash Tables can get up to 4.8x density benefits while achieving up 67% performance speedup
over traditional chained hash tables on single-level PCM.
In Lemonade from Lemons, we build physically-enforced limited-use security architectures
from NEMS switches. We characterize the wearout behaviors of NEMS switches with a prob-
abilistic failure model: Weibull distribution. Then we design architectures that can physically
limit attacks while accommodating legitimate usage. Three use cases are examined: a limited-
use connection, a limited-use targeting system and one-time pads. We propose a family of
architectural techniques to provide statistical guarantee on the minimum and maximum usage
bounds given device variability. We perform extensive engineering space exploration for each
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case to discuss the tradeoffs between fabrication cost, area and energy. For example, redundant
encoding can effectively reduce the area from exponential scaling to linear scaling with the in-
crease of device usage bounds. Overall, we envision new opportunities for physically limiting
vulnerability to attacks through careful engineering of intentional device wearout.
In Memory Cocktail Therapy, we exploit machine learning techniques to optimize the var-
ious NVM techniques that utilize multiple dynamic trade-offs for different applications. Ac-
cording to the experiments, MCT manages to find the near-optimal configuration for the current
application under a user-defined objective. Also, compared to other adaptive systems, MCT in-
curs minimal performance overhead and no hardware modification. In particular, MCT selects
three most important features from the thousands of configurations: fast latency, slow latency
and write cancellation, which provide guidance on how to improve future NVM systems. Also,
these features are general in NVM techniques so that our framework can also be applied to the
optimization of other NVM techniques.
From these architectures, we learned the following benefits of statistical techniques. First,
as architectures are becoming more complicated, the number of features in architectures in-
creases significantly. However, these features may have different importance. It is very chal-
lenging to manually differentiate their importance without a large amount of comparison exper-
iments. Second, the multi-input/multi-output relationship between the features and the archi-
tectural behaviors could be very complicated and counter-intuitive. Meanwhile, the statistical
modeling can capture the relationship accurately at low cost. Third, if we can approximate
the complex end-to-end relationship in programs with functional relationship, we will be able
to reason about the performance bottlenecks and have more opportunities to accelerate and
optimize the program at the hardware level. Finally, the potential benefits of using statistical
techniques also include that, they can learn as they go: updating the feature weights and the
model coefficients while seeing more data.
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